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NATIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Jonathan Remy Nash*
ABSTRACT
Personal jurisdiction has always constrained plaintiffs’ access to courts.
Recent Supreme Court decisions impose even more severe limits, especially in
suits against nonresident foreign corporations. These limitations are magnified
by the standard understanding that the relevant forum for purposes of the
personal jurisdiction calculus is the state. The Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence relies on the state as the relevant forum, and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in the typical case direct a federal court to apply the same test
as would a court of the state in which it sits.
This Article takes on the challenge of exploring the possibility of expanding
the use of national personal jurisdiction, and thus revitalizing plaintiffs’ access
to courts. In so doing, it undertakes three distinct tasks. First, it argues that there
is no Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause barrier to national personal
jurisdiction. Second, it considers the viability of national personal jurisdiction
as to various categories of claims, brought in federal court and state court. It
argues that Congress has the power to introduce national personal jurisdiction
as to all claims brought in the federal courts, but that Congress lacks authority
to introduce national personal jurisdiction as to any claims brought in the state
courts. However, Congress could open the federal courthouse doors wider to
claims where national personal jurisdiction is deemed appropriate. Third, this
Article considers what steps Congress is free to utilize to implement national
personal jurisdiction. While two steps are obvious—Congress can enact
statutory authority and can convey authority to a delegate—this Article focuses
on a more controversial path to national personal jurisdiction: the common law.
It argues that, while federal courts may enjoy interstitial common law powers in
this area, they likely do not have broad powers to generate new instances of
national personal jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
Personal jurisdiction has always constrained plaintiffs’ access to courts;
recent Supreme Court decisions impose even more severe limits, especially in
suits against nonresident foreign corporations. Consider Robert Nicastro, a New
Jersey man who lost several fingers using a machine manufactured by an English
corporation, who tried to bring a tort claim against the corporation. The Court
reasoned that, even though the corporation deliberately sought to send its
products into the United States as a whole, it did not target New Jersey in
particular as a destination for its products.1 As a result, Nicastro could not
(absent the corporation’s consent) obtain specific personal jurisdiction—that is,
jurisdiction where the cause of action arises out of the defendant’s contacts with
the forum2—over the corporation in a New Jersey court. Neither could Nicastro
have obtained general personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction where the
cause of action is unrelated to the defendant’s forum contacts3—over the
corporation, since New Jersey is neither its place of incorporation nor its
principal place of business.4
These conclusions rest inexorably on the assumption that the relevant forum
for purposes of the personal jurisdiction calculus is the state. Focusing on the
forum state accords with the common understanding of the law of personal
jurisdiction. Absent the defendant’s consent or service of process while the
defendant is physically present in the state, a state court may only exert personal
jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent that the defendant has “minimum
contacts” with the forum state and that assertion of personal jurisdiction is not
manifestly unfair.5 The Supreme Court has attributed this limitation to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (and perhaps also to international
law incorporated by the Constitution6), variously describing it as a (i) a personal
liberty interest enjoyed by defendants,7 and (ii) a recognition of the limits of
state sovereignty beyond the state’s borders.8

1

See infra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
3
Id. at 414 n.9.
4
See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
5
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980).
6
See infra note 35.
7
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
8
See, e.g., J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883–84 (2011) (plurality opinion).
The Court in Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), again
identified sovereignty and fairness as the keys to the Fourteenth Amendment calculus. See id. at 1780. The Court
elevated fairness as the more dominant factor, though it also noted that, “at times, th[e] federalism interest may
be decisive.” Id.
2
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The requirement that a defendant must have minimum contacts with the
forum state is not limited to state courts. Rule 4(k)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure establishes the general rule that a federal court, no less than a
state court, cannot exert personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the
defendant has minimum contacts with the state in which the court sits.9 Rule
4(k)(2) provides for a limited exception: Where Congress provides for
nationwide jurisdiction by statute, the Rule allows for nationwide service of
process upon defendants.10 But Congress has enacted such provisions very
sparsely.11 In short, while Rule 4 generally constrains federal courts more than
the Constitution demands, the prerequisite that a defendant have minimum
contacts with the state in which the court sits applies in almost all cases pending
in U.S. courts, both state and federal.
The notion that personal jurisdiction looks to contacts with the forum state
magnifies the scope of the constraints the Court has imposed on personal
jurisdiction in recent years. For many years, most courts and commentators
believed that national corporations—i.e., domestic corporations that do business
in every state (McDonald’s, for example)—were subject to general jurisdiction
in every state.12 Over the last decade, the Court has instead made clear that a
corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is “at home,” which
the Court has translated to mean essentially only at its place of incorporation and
its principal place of business.13 Yet, were contacts with the United States as a
whole the proper standard, it is clear that general jurisdiction would be available
throughout the country. The focus on contacts with a particular state thus
emphasizes the Court’s limits on general jurisdiction. One also might imagine
(assuming that a corporation’s principal place of business can depend on the
location of the corporation’s sales14) a foreign corporation for which the
9
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). The rule has been interpreted to import to federal court litigation state
long-arm statutes as well. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
10
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
11
See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
12
See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in
Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 214 (2014); William M. Richman, Understanding Personal
Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 614 n.88 (1993); Jonathan Remy Nash, Rules, Standards, and General
Jurisdiction 25–26 (Working Paper No. 3228871, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3228871.
13
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915 (2011); infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
14
There are those who believe that a corporation’s “principal place of business” in the context of general
jurisdiction should be defined by reference to the Court’s interpretation of the diversity jurisdiction statute. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business . . . .”); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559
U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010) (“We conclude that ‘principal place of business’ is best read as referring to the place
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principal place of business is the entire United States, but for which the principal
place of business is some other place once sales and employees are
disaggregated on a state-by-state basis.
On the specific jurisdiction front, too, recent decisions highlight the
importance of the relevant forum in the personal jurisdiction calculus. In J.
McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro15 (the facts of which provided the basis for
the opening paragraph), the Court held that New Jersey courts could not exercise
jurisdiction over an English company accused of manufacturing a product that
caused injury in the state, absent a showing that the company “engaged in
conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey.”16 It was not enough that the
company “directed marketing and sales efforts at the United States” as a whole.17
Under this rubric, one can readily conceive of a foreign corporation sued for
breach of contract, where the steps of contract formation took place in numerous
states (but no two steps took place in any one state): Specific jurisdiction would
likely be available were contacts with the country as a whole the proper measure,
but likely unavailable using a state-by-state calculus. The Court also has rejected
the notion that a court may relax the “specific jurisdiction” requirement that the
defendant’s contacts give rise to the claim against the defendant simply because
the defendant has extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to the claim,18
which hinders plaintiffs’ ability to bring nationwide mass actions.19 Once again,
the state-centered focus of personal jurisdiction analysis magnifies the limiting
effect of constraints on the courts’ due process reach.20 A national approach to
personal jurisdiction could, were it available and implemented, mitigate this
effect.
This Article takes on the challenge of exploring the possibility of expanding
the use of national personal jurisdiction, and thus revitalizing plaintiffs’ access
to courts. In so doing, it makes three distinct contributions. First, it examines
carefully the contours of Fifth Amendment limitations on personal jurisdiction.
where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.”). However, the
Supreme Court has never so held, and it can be argued that the Court’s interpretation of a statutory phrase in a
subject matter jurisdiction statute ought not to have bearing in the context of constitutional personal jurisdiction.
For an additional discussion, see Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts:
General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 147–49 (2015).
15
564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality opinion).
16
Id. at 886; see id. at 888–90 (Breyer, J., concurring).
17
Id. at 885 (plurality opinion).
18
See Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
19
See id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
20
See, e.g., Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589,
1596 (1992); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 116–17
(1983); Janice Toran, Federalism, Personal Jurisdiction, and Aliens, 58 TUL. L. REV. 758, 773 (1984).
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It argues first that there is no Fifth Amendment barrier to national personal
jurisdiction where there are minimum contacts with the United States. It next
explores three competing conceptions of fairness under the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause personal jurisdiction analysis: whether it is fair to require
the defendant to litigate (i) within that particular state; (ii) at that particular
location or (iii) within the United States (regardless of the particular location, or
the state). It argues that the last of these conceptions is most logical and
consistent with existing jurisprudence. To the extent that other considerations of
fairness make good policy sense, they can and should be implemented, but they
are not constitutionally required.
This Article’s second contribution is to evaluate obstacles to the
implementation of national personal jurisdiction in various settings. It considers
the viability of national personal jurisdiction, first in federal court, as to claims
brought under federal question jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, and
diversity jurisdiction. It argues that Congress has the power to introduce national
personal jurisdiction as to claims under all these types of jurisdiction brought in
the federal courts. It then turns to the viability of national personal jurisdiction
in state court. It concludes, in sharp contrast to the setting of the federal courts,
that Congress lacks the authority to introduce national personal jurisdiction as
to any claims brought in the state courts. Instead, Congress could take steps to
open the federal courthouse doors wider to claims where national personal
jurisdiction is deemed appropriate.
This Article’s third contribution is to identify what steps are available to
Congress should it wish to implement national personal jurisdiction. Two steps
are obvious: Congress can (as it has) enact statutes authorizing national personal
jurisdiction, and it can convey authority to a delegate—the Supreme Court
(through committees of the Judicial Conference)—to generate rules that make
national personal jurisdiction available.21 It then focuses on a more controversial
path to national personal jurisdiction: the common law. Litigants have argued
for national personal jurisdiction based on the federal courts’ common
lawmaking power,22 and many courts and commentators believe that
supplemental national personal jurisdiction—that is, national personal
jurisdiction as to claims (perhaps even claims brought against additional parties)
that are closely related to a claim properly under federal jurisdiction as to which
there is clear authorization for national personal jurisdiction—is a product of the

21

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012); infra notes 292–93.
See United Rope Distribs., Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532, 534–35 (7th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting the argument).
22
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federal courts’ common lawmaking power.23 This Article argues that, while
federal courts likely enjoy interstitial common law powers in this area, they
likely do not have broad powers to generate new instances of national personal
jurisdiction. Had Congress chosen to rely upon a unitary national federal trial
court, perhaps a common law path to national personal jurisdiction would be
open; but Congress has made a different choice, and that choice forecloses such
a path.
While different aspects of national personal jurisdiction have attracted the
attention of scholars over the years, this Article differs substantially from that of
others who have discussed the topic. Several commentators argue, contrary to
this Article, that the Fifth Amendment poses serious obstacles to national
personal jurisdiction.24 Their concerns lie less with plaintiffs and more with
defendants being forced to defend suits in inconvenient forums under laws they
could not have anticipated. This Article argues that these commentators
misconstrue the Fifth Amendment limits on personal jurisdiction. Further, as a
policy matter, their concerns are adequately addressed by restrictions on venue
and choice of law.
Despite the wealth of commentary against national personal jurisdiction,
other commentators endorse the concept but largely take the constitutionality of
national personal jurisdiction as a given, focusing instead on policy questions.25
While this Article ultimately concludes that national personal jurisdiction is
constitutional, it undertakes a careful assessment of the arguments against
constitutionality;26 considering the extent to which national personal jurisdiction
can be introduced for various types of claims and in federal and state court, and
the propriety of common law-based national personal jurisdiction.27

23

See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
See Jeffrey T. Ferriell, The Perils of Nationwide Service of Process in a Bankruptcy Context, 48 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1199, 1247–53 (1991); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14–85 (1984); Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service
of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 32–48 (1988).
25
Professor Stephen Sachs provides some discussion of the constitutionality of national personal
jurisdiction (including its consistency with the Erie doctrine). See Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix
Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1318–22 (2014). But he quickly turns to the desirability of
national personal jurisdiction and how it could be implemented (including draft legislation). See id. at 1322–53.
Professor Benjamin Spencer advocates greater use of national personal jurisdiction as a policy matter, see A.
Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 325, 327–
29 (2010), but largely takes its constitutionality as a given. See id. at 325–27.
26
See infra Part II.
27
See infra Parts III–IV.
24
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Some commentators focus their analytic heft on the constitutionality of
national personal jurisdiction in federal question cases pending in federal
court;28 this Article’s analysis extends to federal diversity and supplemental
jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction, after all, addresses the question of what
forum(s) may properly host litigation, not what law(s) may apply to resolve
litigation.
Other commentators argue that national personal jurisdiction is applicable
not only in the federal courts, but in the state courts as well.29 This Article rejects
this contention: The Fourteenth Amendment restricts state courts from
exercising national personal jurisdiction, and the Constitution does not authorize
Congress to waive that restriction.30
Another group of commentators argues not in favor of the constitutionality
of national personal jurisdiction writ large, but rather for a subset of federal court
cases involving foreign nonresident defendants;31 two sets of these
commentators further argue in favor of such jurisdiction in cases brought against
foreign nonresident defendants in the state courts.32 These commentators are
correct about the propriety of national personal jurisdiction in federal court but
for the wrong reason: National personal jurisdiction is simply constitutional in
any federal court case, independent of whether the defendant is a foreign
nonresident defendant. And this Article disagrees with those commentators who
argue in favor of the propriety of national personal jurisdiction in state court
cases brought against foreign nonresident defendants.33

28

See Casad, supra note 20, at 1599–1615.
See Casad, supra note 20, at 1615–19; Lilly, supra note 20, at 145–49; Israel Packel, Guest
Commentary, Congressional Power to Reduce Personal Jurisdiction Litigation, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 919, 925–26
(1986); David Carlebach, Note, Nationwide Service of Process in State Courts, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 223, 245
(1991); Charles W. Adams, A Call for a Federal Long Arm Statute to Confer Lawful Authority over Nonresidents
on the State Courts 76–102 (Univ. of Tulsa Legal Studies Research Paper, Working Paper No. 2012-07, 2012).
30
See infra Section III.B.1.
31
See Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European
Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 155 (1992); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the
Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 455, 456 (2004).
32
See Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of
Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 816–17 (1988); William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson,
Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2018). Professor Peter Hay argues that case
law is arguably consistent with a national approach to minimum contacts in federal question cases (though that
result is less clear in state law cases). Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country Corporate
Defendants—Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REV. 431, 434–35, 435 n.23 (1984).
33
See infra Section III.B.4.
29
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a general overview of
Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdictional jurisprudence. It discusses how
state courts, and for the most part federal courts as well, are obligated (absent
consent or presence within the state) to consider the defendant’s contacts with
the state and whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be manifestly
unfair. Part II explores the analogous question in the context of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. It concludes that (i) there is no Fifth
Amendment barrier to national personal jurisdiction, and (ii) the best answer is
that concerns of fairness in this context should relate only to whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction in the United States is fair, not whether the particular
location of the forum within the United States is fair. Importantly, the key
conclusion is not that this is a good policy outcome, but rather that the
Constitution has little, if anything, to say on the subject.
Part III examines whether Congress has the power to install national personal
jurisdiction as the relevant standards in various settings. In turn, it considers
different types of claims in federal court, and then in state court. Part IV then
considers various methods that Congress might employ to establish a national
personal jurisdictional standard. It focuses on the possibility of Congress doing
nothing, with courts generating such a standard on a common law basis. It
concludes that such a possibility is, at best, severely limited. It should fall to
Congress to implement national personal jurisdiction in appropriate settings.
I.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT LIMITS ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION

This Part offers a short primer on the constitutional limit34 on personal
jurisdiction35 with which most lawyers are familiar—the limit prescribed by the

34
Professor Sachs has argued that the Constitution imposes no direct limit on personal jurisdiction; rather,
federal general law incorporates preexisting background principles on sovereignty. See Stephen E. Sachs,
Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1255–84 (2017). States remained free to extend personal jurisdiction
beyond these background principles, although courts of other sovereigns remained free to decline to recognize
such extensions. See id. at 1284–87. In turn, according to Professor Sachs, the Fourteenth Amendment changed
this landscape by providing for direct federal review—and therefore direct constraint—of state judgments, rather
than leaving the issue to a subsequent suit for recognition of earlier state court judgments. See id. at 1297–1313.
Importantly, however, the Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding, the Full Faith and Credit Clause empowers
Congress to override federal general law and constrict the jurisdictional reach of the state courts or expand them
beyond the background principles’ limitations. See id. at 1317–18.
35
There is an argument that the ratification of the Constitution itself incorporated background principles
of international law that put limits on extraterritorial assertions of personal jurisdiction. See Burnham v. Superior
Court of Cal., Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 616–17 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“[The discussion in Pennoyer]
for its statement of the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the exercise of discretion, in fact set
forth only as dictum [since the judgment had been rendered before the Amendment’s ratification.]”); see also
Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L.
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.36 Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process limits apply when a state tries to assert personal jurisdiction over a
defendant37 outside its territorial limits38 and without the defendant’s consent.39
Through its long-arm statute, or by not adopting a long-arm statute at all, a state
also may constrain its courts’ personal jurisdictional reach even more than does
the Fourteenth Amendment.40
Section A discusses the limits of personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Section B explains that, while the Fourteenth
Amendment by its terms naturally applies to state court litigation, it also
typically—but not always—applies in federal court litigation. Section B then
details settings in which the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply in federal
court litigation.

REV. 1217, 1220–21 (1992) (federal long-arm statutes may be limited by the Fifth Amendment and international
law); Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer
Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 499–500 (1987) (describing the Pennoyer Court’s consideration of the
Fourteenth Amendment as “startling”). The logic of restrictions on personal jurisdiction originating in
background public international law principles notwithstanding, the Court has suggested that due process is the
sole progenitor of personal jurisdiction requirements. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
36
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37
It is almost completely, but not entirely, uncontested that foreign defendants can invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause’s limitations on personal jurisdiction. A couple of commentators have relied
upon Supreme Court authority limiting the applicability of other constitutional provisions in the context of
foreign nonresidents. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). Specifically, their
arguments focus on the assertion that foreign defendants ought not enjoy the benefits of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause with respect to personal jurisdiction. See Gary A. Haugen, Personal
Jurisdiction and Due Process Rights for Alien Defendants, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 109, 115–17 (1993); Austen L.
Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 28–41 (2006). Professors Dodge and Dodson reject this line of argument, pointing out that
(i) the Court has never suggested that its holdings limiting the applicability to foreigners of particular
constitutional provisions have application to the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments, (ii) ”a U.S. court exercising
adjudicatory authority over an alien in violation of a Due Process Clause is by definition violating the
Constitution within the United States,” and (iii) the Court has regularly applied the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause to foreign defendants. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1221–22. This Article
assumes, along with the vast majority of commentators, that foreign nonresident defendants enjoy the benefits
of Due Process limitations on personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 846 (2013). Dean Austen Parrish argues that, to the extent that foreign nonresident
defendants can at all claim the benefit of Due Process Clause limitations on personal jurisdiction, they should
be able to invoke sovereignty-based, but not liberty-based, aspects of those limitations. See Parrish, supra, at
54–56. This argument lies beyond the scope of this Article.
38
A defendant’s presence within the forum state is enough to satisfy the Due Process Clause. See
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608–22; id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
39
A defendant as to whom personal jurisdiction would otherwise be improper can nevertheless consent
to a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703.
40
See, e.g., Casad, supra note 20, at 1592.
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A. The Limits of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court has attributed Fourteenth Amendment personal
jurisdiction protections to two sources. First, the Court has highlighted the
importance of restricting a state’s ability to exert its sovereignty beyond its
borders. Second, the Court has depicted Due Process protections as a liberty
interest personal to defendants. In a 1982, the Court used language that seemed
to disavow the sovereignty basis for personal jurisdiction limitations.41 More
recently, however, the Court has once again emphasized the importance of
sovereignty in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process calculus.42
The modern approach to Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdictional
limits dates to the Supreme Court’s 1945 opinion in International Shoe, Co. v.
Washington.43 There, the Court explained that whether a court had permissible
personal jurisdiction over a defendant was a function of (A)(i) the extent of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state, and (ii) the extent to which those
contacts gave rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action, as balanced by
(B) consideration of the extent to which requiring the defendant to litigate in the
forum would be fair.44
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court adopted from legal academics a
fundamental dichotomy in the permissible types of personal jurisdiction.45
“Specific jurisdiction” is personal jurisdiction under circumstances where the
cause of action against the defendant arises out of the defendant’s contacts with
the forum.46 “General jurisdiction” is personal jurisdiction under circumstances
where the cause of action against the defendant has no connection with the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.47
1. General Jurisdiction
Insofar as general jurisdiction applies where the cause of action is unrelated
to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, a forum in which a defendant is
41
42

See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702.
See, e.g., J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884, 903 n.10 (2011) (plurality

opinion).
43

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See id. at 317–18.
45
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Rhodes &
Robertson, supra note 12, at 235 n.162. Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman originated the
terms in the 1960s. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
46
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8.
47
Id. at 414 n.9.
44
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subject to general jurisdiction is one where the defendant can be sued for any
cause of action whatsoever. In a 1952 case, the Court made clear that a
Philippine corporation could be sued in Ohio where, owing to World War II, the
corporation’s headquarters was effectively located in Ohio.48 In a 1984 case, the
Court made clear that substantial, but not overwhelmingly continuous and
systematic, contacts with a forum are not sufficient to support general
jurisdiction.49 Based on these cases, lower courts uniformly concluded that
corporations were subject to general jurisdiction in the place of their
incorporation and in the state of their principal place of business.50 Most lower
courts also considered a corporation subject to general jurisdiction in a forum
where it was “doing business,” although the lower courts varied as to the test to
be applied for whether a corporation was sufficiently “doing business” in a
forum.51
The Supreme Court used two cases in the 2010s to substantially narrow the
reach of general jurisdiction. In Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v.
Brown52 and Daimler AG v. Bauman,53 the Court held that a corporation is
subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is “at home.”54 The Court
elucidated that a corporation is “at home” where it is incorporated and at its
principal place of business;55 while there may conceivably be other forums
where a corporation is at home, the Court has indicated that such situations
would be very rare.56
2. Specific Jurisdiction
With respect to specific jurisdiction, the Court has explained that the focus
of the inquiry should be on the extent to which the defendant has “purposefully
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,”57 i.e., the extent to which
“the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a
sovereign.”58 The Court has developed different specific jurisdiction tests for

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446–48 (1952).
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409–18.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See Nash, supra note 12, at 24–26.
564 U.S. 915 (2011).
571 U.S. 117 (2014).
See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924.
See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136.
See id. at 139 n.19.
See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011) (plurality opinion).
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various kinds of civil actions a plaintiff might bring. In contracts cases, the
relevant contacts would relate to contract formation.59 In a defamation case (and
perhaps generally in intentional torts cases), the relevant test for minimum
contacts looks to where the behavior that led to the alleged injury, and the effects
of that behavior, took place.60 The Justices have had more trouble agreeing on a
test for typical products liability and negligence cases,61 but it seems that the
relevant contacts are (i) harm experienced in the forum, (ii) the extent to which
the defendant placed its product into the “stream of commerce” with the product
eventually winding up in the forum, and (iii) beyond that, some modicum of
“purposeful[] avail[ment]” directed toward the forum by the defendant.62 Note
that, under all these tests, the “forum” as to which the court is to focus is the
state in which the court sits.
Last Term, in Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San
Francisco County, the Court made clear the “specific jurisdiction” requirement
that the defendant’s contacts give rise to the claim against the defendant is not
relaxed simply because the defendant has extensive forum contacts that are
unrelated to the claim.63 The Court explained that “[o]ur cases provide no
support for this approach,”64 which, according to the Court, “resembles a loose
and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”65
B. The Fourteenth Amendment and Federal Court Litigation
Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction restrictions can apply as well
in proceedings in federal court. Indeed, some of the Court’s seminal Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process cases have arisen out of federal court litigation.66 Still,
the reason that the Fourteenth Amendment applies in federal court litigation
differs from the reason it applies in state court litigation. The Fourteenth
Amendment applies of its own accord in state court litigation. This is not
59

See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985).
See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984).
61
Compare Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (noting personal jurisdiction is not created merely by “[t]he placement of a product into the
stream of commerce, without more”), with id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (disagreeing on this point); see McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 883 (plurality opinion) (“Justice Brennan’s
[Asahi] concurrence, advocating a rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent
with the premises of lawful judicial power.”).
62
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112; id. at 121 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
63
See 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120–21 (2014) (federal question case); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1985) (diversity case).
60
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surprising, since the Amendment applies by its terms to states.67 In federal court,
by contrast, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally
incorporates by reference the limitations under the Fourteenth Amendment.68
This said, there are situations where, under current law, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not govern the personal jurisdictional reach of a federal court.
Rule 4 itself authorizes some exertions of personal jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries of the state in which the federal court sits.69 Certain federal statutes
allow for nationwide service of process in cases filed in the federal district
courts.70 And Congress has over the years established unitary federal trial
courts—generally of limited jurisdiction—with nationwide reach.71 The
following Part discusses these various examples of nationwide federal personal
jurisdiction.
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Does the Constitution itself pose any restrictions on the personal
jurisdictional reach of the federal courts and on Congress’s ability to prescribe
the personal jurisdiction of the federal courts? To whatever extent the original
Constitution as ratified in 1788 did not pose any restrictions,72 it seems clear that
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does.73

67
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” (emphasis added)).
68
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); see 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1068.1 (4th ed. 2015); Lilly, supra note 20, at 134. Rule 4 also incorporates the applicable state long-arm
statute. Cf. Lilly, supra note 20, at 135–36 (noting that some federal courts have relied upon a strong federal
interest to assert personal jurisdiction consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment but even where the otherwise
applicable state long-arm statute would not allow it, but also explaining that such an approach, “implemented
without direct support in the [state long-arm] statute or the [federal] rules, must rest upon the uncertain ground
of federal common law”).
69
See infra notes 96–107 and accompanying text.
70
See Lilly, supra note 20, at 130–32; infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
71
See infra notes 111–18 and accompanying text.
72
There is an argument that the ratification of the Constitution itself formalized certain principles of
international law that imposed limits on personal jurisdiction. See supra note 35.
73
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; Mariash v. Morrill,
496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); Lilly, supra note 20, at 122; Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits
of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1643 (2001). To the extent that (as Professor Sachs has
argued) the Constitution imposes no direct limits on personal jurisdiction and the Fourteenth Amendment leaves
Congress free to contract or extend the personal jurisdictional reach of the state courts, the Tribunals Clause
and/or the Necessary and Proper Clause similarly empower Congress to extend the personal jurisdictional reach
of the federal courts. See Sachs, supra note 34, at 1318–19.
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The question still remains—exactly what are those restraints? The Supreme
Court has explicitly reserved the question of what restraints the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes on courts.74 Still, logic allows us to
develop a framework for Fifth Amendment Due Process protections. Save for
the relevant sovereign, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause tracks
the language of the Fifth’s.75 Thus, to the extent that the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes restrictions on the reach of personal jurisdiction, it stands to reason that
the Fifth Amendment does as well. If the Fourteenth Amendment requires
consideration of minimum contacts and concerns of fairness, so too does the
Fifth Amendment.76 This leaves the question, then, of how these two factors
translate from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to its Fifth
Amendment counterpart. The following sections consider each factor in turn.
A. Minimum Contacts
It stands to reason and has been held that, while the Fourteenth Amendment
measures contacts with the state, the Fifth Amendment considers contacts with
the entire United States.77 To the extent that the Due Process Clause ties
jurisdiction to sovereignty, the Fifth Amendment’s Clause should extend the
reach of personal jurisdiction to the sovereignty of the United States. To the
extent that the Due Process Clause ties jurisdiction to defendants’ liberty interest
against being called upon to defend suits in a forum with which it has no ties,
the Fifth Amendment’s Clause should preclude foreign nonresident defendants
with no ties to the United States being called upon to defend suits in the United
States.78
Just as the Fourteenth Amendment does not restrict personal jurisdiction
within states, so too ought the Fifth Amendment not restrict personal jurisdiction

74
See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011) (plurality opinion); Omni
Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (plurality opinion).
75
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”).
76
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
77
See id.; Adams v. Unione Mediterranea di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 650 (5th Cir. 2004); United Rope
Distribs., Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991); Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834
F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987).
78
This assumes that foreign nonresident defendants can claim the benefit of Due Process Clause
limitations on personal jurisdiction. See supra note 37.
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within the United States.79 In other words, the Fifth Amendment imposes no
obstacle to nationwide personal jurisdiction.80
That the Constitution does not require anything beyond contacts with the
entire United States—i.e., that it does not require contacts with any particular
state—can be seen from the freedom Congress enjoys to design the geographic
scope of federal courts. The prevailing wisdom is that the Madisonian
Compromise preserved Congress’s freedom not to create lower federal courts at
all.81 And the Court has explained that that freedom not to create lower courts at
all includes the lesser power to create as few (or as many) lower federal courts
as it wishes, with as little (or as much) jurisdiction as it wishes.82 If that is true,
then Congress could establish federal trial courts whose jurisdictional reach
extends across state lines; indeed, it could even set up a single federal trial court
with national jurisdiction.83 And, in turn, if that is true, then logic would strongly
suggest that the relevant minimum contact analysis should focus on connections
with the nation, and not any particular state.84

79

See Lilly, supra note 20, at 128.
See AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
437 (1969) [hereinafter ALI 1969 STUDY] (accompanying memorandum entitled: “The constitutionality of
service of federal court process without regard to state boundaries”); Lilly, supra note 20, at 123; Sachs, supra
note 25, at 1319–20; see also Casad, supra note 20; Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A
Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REV. 470, 481–82 (1981).
81
See, e.g., Michael Collins & Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Federalism Under Marshall and Taney, 2017
SUP. CT. REV. 337, 352.
82
See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 603 (1878); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 448–
49 (1850).
83
See Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. at 602–03; Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the
Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1982). Even among “mandatory
vesting theories” that argue (contrary to the Supreme Court’s position) that Congress was obligated to create
some lower federal courts, there is none that believes it obligatory on Congress to create at least one federal
district court per state or to create districts that adhere to state lines, or that would find it problematic were
Congress to create a single federal trial court. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985). The Union Pacific R.R. Co. Court
was open to the possibility that the Constitution required the creation of at least one federal district court in each
state to the extent that Congress created federal crimes, but adhered to the general position that otherwise (and
certainly with respect to non-criminal cases) there was no such requirement. 98 U.S. at 603. The Court noted
constitutional provisions under Article 3, Section 2 providing that the “trial of all crimes . . . be held in the State
where they shall have been committed,” and under the Sixth Amendment that, “in all criminal prosecutions[,]
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[,] by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. at 608; see also Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 336–37 (1816) (suggesting that federal criminal jurisdiction must be vested in the
lower federal courts). The Court concluded: “These provisions, which relate solely to the place of the trial for
criminal offences, do not affect the general proposition.” Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. at 603.
84
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. at 603; Abrams, supra note 83, at 2.
80
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The Court used such reasoning in the 1878 case of United States v. Union Pacific
R.R. Co.,85 decided well after the approval of the Fifth Amendment. The Court
concluded:
There is, therefore, nothing in the Constitution which forbids Congress
to enact that, as to a class of cases or a case of special character, a
circuit court—any circuit court— in which the suit may be brought,
shall, by process served anywhere in the United States, have the power
to bring before it all the parties necessary to its decision.86

The Supreme Court has cited its Union Pacific holding favorably over the
years.87 Not surprisingly, lower courts have generally concluded that the Fifth
Amendment minimum contacts analysis considers the contacts between the
defendant and the United States as a whole.88
In arguing to the contrary—that Congress has understood some
constitutional prohibition against federal service of process across state lines—
some commentators have relied on the fact that federal district courts almost
always observe state lines as support.89 However, while Congress has generally
created federal trial courts that observe state lines, there have been exceptions.90
85
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. at 603–04. Professor Maryellen Fullerton discounts the Union Pacific
Court’s reasoning, asserting that the Court addressed the issue only “in passing.” Fullerton, supra note 24, at 28.
In fact, the Court’s holding on personal jurisdiction was not dicta (especially given the strict jurisdictional
sequencing then in effect at the Court), and the Court devoted no fewer than three pages in the United States
Reports. See Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. at 602–05.
86
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. at 604.
87
See, e.g., Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946).
88
See, e.g., Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984); Mariash
v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974) (panel including retired Justice Tom Clark). But see Honeywell,
Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[W]e can perceive no operative difference
between the concept of due process as applied to the states and as applied to the federal government.”).
89
See Fullerton, supra note 24, at 32, 34–35. Historically, Congress has also incorporated state
boundaries as limits on some federal court service of process. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68. But see Sachs,
supra note 25, at 1319 (“[F]ederal courts could send some of their process nationwide as early as 1793. And
federal personal jurisdiction didn’t rely on state lines in particular until the Federal Rules’ adoption in 1938 . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
90
The fact that Congress, and perhaps especially early Congresses, have created districts that span state
boundaries reflects a congressional belief in the constitutionality of such districts. On the other hand,
congressional practice in favor of creating districts that lie wholly within states is not necessarily probative of a
congressional belief that the opposite practice—the creation of interstate districts—is not constitutional. Such
congressional action is subconstitutional and reflects a congressional belief about the constitutionality of
interstate districts only to the extent that Congress felt constitutionally obligated to avoid interstate districts. In
general, steps by Congress that are not clearly congressionally mandated may simply reflect Congress’s
subconstitutional preference. Cf. Fullerton, supra note 24, at 35–36 (arguing that subconstitutional doctrines like
venue transfer and the doctrine of forum non conveniens are insufficient to protect constitutional interests). For
example, in questioning the constitutionality of bankruptcy courts asserting nationwide personal jurisdiction
over state law claims, Professor Jackie Gardina points to “support in the Bankruptcy Code itself for the
proposition that not all aspects of the bankruptcy need be litigated within a single bankruptcy court forum.”
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Early on, the Federalist-controlled Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1801,91
which created a federal district court—the District of Potomac—that extended
beyond state lines.92 While this district was short-lived—it was dissolved in
180293—there have been a few other examples of federal judicial districts
extending beyond state lines over the history of the Republic.94 Indeed, there is
today one federal judicial district that extends beyond state lines: Since its
creation over a century ago, the so-called United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming has included the entirety of the Yellowstone National Park,
including the portions of that Park that lie within the borders of Idaho and
Montana.95 The history, and in particular this long-standing example, thus
demonstrates congressional endorsement of cross-border federal judicial
districts, if under limited circumstances, and an implicit assertion of the power
to assert personal jurisdiction across state borders.
Even for the standard federal district that does not traverse state boundaries,
Rule 4 offers no fewer than three exceptions to its own general rule that a federal
district court adhere to the Fourteenth Amendment (and long-arm statutory)
restrictions that bind a court of the state in which the federal district court sits.96
Jackie Gardina, The Bankruptcy of Due Process: Nationwide Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction and the
Bankruptcy Rules, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 37, 64 (2008). But the Bankruptcy Code is clearly
subconstitutional, and the drafters may simply have had a subconstitutional preference for litigation in a single
bankruptcy court forum.
91
Judiciary Act of 1801, § 1, 2 Stat. 89 (1801) (repealed 1802).
92
Id. § 21, 2 Stat. at 96.
93
See Amendatory Act of 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157–59 (1802); Judiciary Act of 1802, § 1, 2 Stat. 132
(1802) (current version in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (repealing the 1801 Act).
94
See Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man’s Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895, 1003–04, 1006–10,
1012–13 (2002).
95
See 28 U.S.C. § 131 (2012). The provisions creating the federal district courts for the Districts of
Montana and Idaho expressly leave out the portions of those states that lie within Yellowstone National Park.
Id. §§ 92, 106.
96
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1)–(2). Even Rule 4’s general rule of state law governing personal jurisdiction
in federal court has been questioned in some circumstances in the past. A prior version of Rule 4 provided:
Whenever a statute or rule of a court of the state in which the district court is held provides
(1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party
not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear
and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar
seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) (1993 text, amended 2000). A minority of courts interpreted this provision to allow a federal
district court to assert personal jurisdiction in federal question cases based on national minimum contacts
provided that the requirements of the state long-arm statute were met. Put another way, these courts would have
allowed application of a state long-arm statute even where its application in state court would be unconstitutional
(because the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts test would be violated). See, e.g., United Rope Distribs.,
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First, Rule 4 allows for the addition of third-party defendants and necessary
defendants (who are not already in the case) when they are “served within a
judicial district of the United States and not more than 100 miles from where the
summons was issued.”97
Second, Rule 4 allows a federal court to exert personal jurisdiction over a
defendant where it is “authorized by a federal statute.”98 And Congress has
indeed enacted statutes that authorize broader service of process. As early as
1917, Congress enacted an interpleader statute that allows for nationwide service
of process.99 Congress has since afforded similar treatment to certain causes of
action under securities laws,100 antitrust laws,101 patent laws,102 federal law
governing pension plans,103 and the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) statute,104 among others. It has also authorized
nationwide service in minimal diversity cases arising out of mass accidents.105
Third, Rule 4 has a special provision that authorizes personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who faces a federal cause of action and has minimum contacts

Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532, 535–36 (7th Cir. 1991); Handley v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 732
F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir. 1984); see Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporations
and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967, 981 (1961); Note, supra note 80, at 474–81. The 1993 amendment of
Rule 4 to include Rule 4(k)(2)—which allows for national personal jurisdiction as to a federal claim where no
state court would have personal jurisdiction—seems to have mooted this issue. See Kohler Co. v. Titon Indus.,
Inc., 948 F. Supp. 815, 819–20 (E.D. Wis. 1996). For an exploration of various courts’ reasoning under the old
version of Rule 4, see Marilyn J. Berger, Acquiring In Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases:
Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 285, 310–18.
97
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B).
98
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C).
99
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, at § 3636. Today, the district courts derive subject matter
jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1335. The basis for nationwide personal jurisdiction is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2361.
100
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa(b) (2012).
101
See 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2012).
102
See 28 U.S.C. § 1694 (2012).
103
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012).
104
While the courts of appeals that have confronted the issue agree that civil RICO contemplates
nationwide service of process in some circumstances, there is a circuit split as to exactly which provision of the
RICO service of process statute grants that authority: subsection (b) or subsection (d) of 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2012).
Compare Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2006) (relying on subsection (b)), and
Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) (same), and Butcher’s Union Local No.
498 v. SDC Investment, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986) (same), with ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut,
Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 627 (4th Cir. 1997) (relying on subsection (d)), and Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings
(Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir. 1997) (same), with PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138
F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying on both subsections (b) and (d)).
105
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369(a), 1697 (2012).
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with the United States but not with any state.106 This jurisdiction is available
only if it is “consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.”107
Beyond Rule 4, federal bankruptcy courts, which are designated as “units”
of the federal district courts,108 have the power to effect nationwide service of
process and assert personal jurisdiction across state lines. Rule 7004 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure expressly authorizes nationwide service
of process,109 and authorizes personal jurisdiction to the federal constitutional
and statutory limit.110
Looking beyond the federal district courts, one can find examples of national
federal trial courts that enjoy (by necessity) the power to assert personal
jurisdiction nationally. The short-lived U.S. Commerce Court was an Article III
court during the early 1910s.111 While it is best known for hearing challenges to
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission,112 in which case the government
would have been the respondent and so personal jurisdiction would not have
been an issue, the court also had jurisdiction to hear some Commission
enforcement proceedings.113 Although empowered to hold sessions throughout
the United States, the court held its regular sessions in Washington, D.C.,114 and
Congress authorized nationwide service of process with respect to court
proceedings.115
The U.S. Court of International Trade provides a modern-day example of a
national trial court. The court, which sits predominantly in New York City, has
jurisdiction over certain civil enforcement actions related to international

106

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)(B).
108
See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
109
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d).
110
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(f).
111
Congress created the court in 1910 and abolished it in 1913. E.g., Edward V. Di Lello, Fighting Fire
with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 504 (1993). For a
discussion of the politics leading to the creation of the court, see Felix Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme
Court of the United States—A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 39 HARV. L. REV. 587, 594–603 (1926). For
a brief history of the court, see WILLIAM SEAL CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 78–83,
86–88, 90, 92–94 (1918); FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 153–74 (1927); Philip B. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure
of Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 683–86 (1969).
112
See, e.g., Di Lello, supra note 111, at 504.
113
See Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539, 539 (1910).
114
Id. at 541.
115
Id. (“[P]rocess may run, be served, and be returnable anywhere in the United States . . . .”).
107
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trade,116 and also over third-party claims brought by parties before the court.117
The court’s rules of procedure authorize nationwide service of process and even
service abroad, where the defendant would not be subject to the jurisdiction of
any state’s courts.118
Congressional practice and judicial understandings are thus hardly
inconsistent with the notion of national personal jurisdiction.119 Some who urge
that the Fifth Amendment should look to contacts with the state (despite the
history and logic to the contrary) emphasize that times have changed, and that
the size of the United States today implicates concerns that simply were not
present in a bygone age.120 Of course, even as the country has grown, so too have
technological advances made travel across the country much easier and
cheaper.121 Moreover, Congress continues to keep in place national trial courts
without much objection,122 which suggests that the historical practice remains
acceptable today.

116

See 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (2012).
See id. § 1583.
118
See U.S. CT. INT’L TRADE R. 4(j)(2). Congress statutorily authorized the court to “prescribe rules
governing the summons, pleadings, and other papers, for their amendment, service, and filing, for consolidations,
severances, suspensions of cases, and for other procedural matters.” 28 U.S.C. § 2633(b) (2012).
119
To the extent that personal jurisdiction is required in such settings, the federal judicial architecture
outside the setting of a traditional trial court further confirms the validity of national personal jurisdiction. Where
civil actions with common questions of fact are pending in multiple federal districts, Congress has authorized
the transfer of those actions to a single district (chosen by the “judicial panel on multidistrict litigation”) for
“coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). Lower courts have rejected the
argument that the transferee court for pretrial matters must meet the Fourteenth Amendment’s personal
jurisdiction requirements, citing Congress’s freedom to empower federal district courts with national personal
jurisdiction. See e.g., Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2010); see also
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, at § 1067.3 n.19 (referring to minimum contacts not applying to a transferee court
under the multidistrict litigation statute). For an argument that a multidistrict litigation transferee court should
require proper personal jurisdiction, see Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1165 (2018). While an appellate court hearing an appeal from a trial court relies on the personal
jurisdiction established by the trial court, it nonetheless is worth noting that almost all federal appellate courts
have jurisdiction that extend beyond the bounds of a single state or territory. Setting aside the Supreme Court
(which the Constitution sets as a unitary national court under Article III, Section 2), in today’s federal judiciary,
the jurisdiction of a typical federal court of appeals extends over a region consisting of several states (and even
federal territories). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia hears appeals from the District of
Columbia itself, but also hears cases involving administrative law on a nationwide basis. And the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction. See Sachs, supra note 25, at 1319 (citing the
existence of regional federal courts of appeals and a unitary national Supreme Court to bolster the
constitutionality of national minimum contacts).
120
See Fullerton, supra note 24, at 32.
121
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957).
122
See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
117

NASH_FINALPROOFS2

530

1/30/2019 12:11 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:509

In sum, like its Fourteenth Amendment counterpart, the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause imposes a minimum contacts requirement on the exercise
of personal jurisdiction. However, the minimum contacts analysis under the
Fifth Amendment looks to contacts with the United States as a whole, not any
one particular state forum.
B. Concerns of Fairness
Beyond minimum contacts, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis
requires consideration of whether the forum in question is sufficiently “fair” to
the defendant otherwise properly under personal jurisdiction. How does this
requirement translate to the setting of the Fifth Amendment? Case law and
commentators identify three possibilities,123 summarized in Table 1.

Type of
Fairness
Analysis
National
Fairness

LocationBased
Fairness

StateBased
Fairness

Table 1: Various Interpretations of Fairness Analysis
Under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
Interaction
Interaction with
with
Foreign Nonresident
Definition
Domestic
Defendant124
Defendant
Fairness inquiry that
No
Unfairness possible,
examines fairness of
unfairness
but fairness does not
calling upon defendant to
possible
vary depending upon
defend within the United
the precise location
States (regardless of
of the court
location)
Fairness inquiry that
Unfairness
Unfairness possible
examines fairness of
possible
depending upon
calling upon defendant to
depending
location of court
defend at a particular
upon
location (but without
location of
regard to state lines)
court
Fairness inquiry that
Unfairness
Unfairness possible
examines fairness of
possible
depending upon the
calling upon defendant to
depending
state
defend within the state in
upon the
which the court lies
state

123
See Casad, supra note 20, at 1600–02 (surveying cases to identify “four different views of what Fifth
Amendment due process requires[,]” three of which resemble the three approaches this Article discusses, and
the fourth of which Professor Casad dismisses as based on a misreading of prior precedent).
124
This assumes that foreign nonresident defendants enjoy the protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, at least with respect to personal jurisdiction. See supra note 37.
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National fairness is the precise analog to fairness as it is understood in the
Fourteenth Amendment context. Under “national fairness,” the inquiry is simply
whether litigation in the United States—regardless of the actual location of the
litigation within the United States—would promote “fair play” to a defendant.125
Just as the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry has nothing to say about a state court
asserting jurisdiction over a state resident (regardless of the location of the court
within the state), so too is national fairness unconcerned with a federal court
asserting jurisdiction over a U.S. resident (regardless of the location of the court
within the United States). And, just as the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry as
applied to a nonresident (not present within the borders of the state) looks at the
unfairness of requiring that nonresident to defend suit in the forum state
regardless of the precise location of the court within the state, so too does
national fairness look at the unfairness of requiring a nonresident of the United
States—including a corporation incorporated, or having its principal place of
business, in the United States—to defend suit in the United States, again
regardless of the precise location of the court within the United States.
The remaining two possible forms of Fifth Amendment fairness treat U.S.
residents and nonresidents identically. Under “location-based fairness,” the
relevant inquiry is the extent to which it is unfair to require the defendant to
defend suit at the location of the court without regard to state lines.126 One could
imagine here it being fair to require a defendant to defend suit at one location
within a state, but unfair to require it at another.
Under “state-based fairness,” the relevant inquiry is the extent to which it is
unfair to require the defendant to defend suit in the state in which the court is
located.127 This version of fairness in effect transplants the standard Fourteenth
Amendment fairness inquiry directly into the Fifth Amendment calculus.
The first interpretation—national fairness—is the approach taken by many
courts.128 It is surely more consistent with the logic of existing Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence.129 Nothing in that jurisprudence suggests that a
defendant has standing to challenge the precise location of litigation within a
forum where personal jurisdiction exists.130 Bolstering this notion is the fact that,
once personal jurisdiction obtains, litigation conceivably may continue to a state

125
126
127
128
129
130

See Lilly, supra note 20, at 141–42.
See Ferriell, supra note 24, at 1248; infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
See Lusardi, supra note 24, at 34; infra note 137 and accompanying text.
See Casad, supra note 20, at 1601.
See id. at 1606.
See Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987).
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intermediate appellate court and the state supreme court. And litigation before
those courts will take place where those courts sit, regardless of whether that
litigation at those locations would prove onerous to the defendant.131
Similar logic suggests that, where minimum contacts with the United States
arise, fairness concerns are not a sufficient basis to challenge the location of the
trial court within the United States. Indeed, analogous to the setting of state court
litigation, litigation that commences in a federal district court may eventually
proceed to a federal court of appeals and potentially to the Supreme Court—the
locations of which may be (and indeed are likely to be) more onerous than the
location of the federal district court. Yet, there has never been any suggestion
that any such unfairness warrants relocating the location of appellate
litigation.132
Proponents of location-based fairness argue that the Supreme Court has
renounced the notion that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process restrictions on
personal jurisdiction arise out of concerns of state sovereignty, and instead arise
entirely out of concerns of fairness.133 As discussed above, however, to whatever
extent this once was an accurate assessment of the Supreme Court’s view, recent
cases have confirmed the continuing importance of sovereignty as a driving
factor behind the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.134
Further refuting this position is the fact that in no Fourteenth Amendment
case has the Court (or any lower court) suggested that fairness concerns render
off limits litigation at a particular location within a state. Were Due Process
concerned with fairness of location within a sovereign (where the propriety of
jurisdiction is otherwise not subject to question), one would have thought that
such a case would have arisen—especially in states encompassing large
geographic areas, like Alaska, California, and Texas.135 While courts and
commentators acknowledge that decisions to site litigation in locations that
would “make the offer of adjudication a mirage” might implicate fundamental
fairness and violate one (or both) of the Due Process Clauses, any such violations
would be independent of restrictions on personal jurisdiction.136
131
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031,
1036 (7th Cir. 2000).
132
See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 25, at 1319.
133
See Fullerton, supra note 24, at 22; Gardina, supra note 90, at 44, 46; see also Ferriell, supra note 24,
at 1217–22 (making a similar argument, but also noting that the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in
Burnham v. Superior Court “raises more questions about this analysis than it resolves”).
134
See, e.g., Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d at 1036, see supra note 8.
135
See Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d at 1036; Casad, supra note 20, at 1603.
136
See Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d at 1036; Sachs, supra note 25, at 1320.
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Few courts have endorsed the last option137—state-based fairness—and for
good reason. It would be very odd indeed if (as strongly seems to be the case)
state boundaries were irrelevant for Fifth Amendment minimum contacts
purposes, yet somehow relevant for the Fifth Amendment fairness calculus.
Location-based and state-based fairness found a proponent in then-District
Judge Edward Becker, who in 1974 developed a multifactor analysis for Fifth
Amendment fairness that focused on where the judicial forum (i.e., the state or
federal judicial district) was located and the state of incorporation of the
defendant.138 Some later cases cite Judge Becker’s test favorably,139 but the test
has also been criticized for conflating constitutional fairness with propriety of
venue.140 Moreover, even cases that cite favorably to Judge Becker’s test
emphasize that the test should be interpreted narrowly such that unfairness is
found very rarely.141
Similar to arguments raised in the minimum contacts context,142 supporters
of location-based and state-based fairness argue that the Fifth Amendment
fairness calculus, owing to the size of the country, ought to take into account the
location of the trial court within the United States.143 In fact, existing Supreme
Court precedent suggests that the Fifth Amendment’s concern with fair access
to justice is limited.144 Moreover, the arguments based on unfairness of location
seem overblown. The heightened fairness concerns that result from great
distances are countered by new technologies that make traversing those
distances much easier and cheaper than traversing far shorter distances was in

137

See Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 947 (11th Cir. 1997).
See Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203–04 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
139
See, e.g., Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000); see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment (noting that, beyond minimum contacts with
the United States, “[t]here also may be a further Fifth Amendment constraint in that a plaintiff’s forum selection
might be so inconvenient to a defendant that it would be a denial of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ required
by the due process clause”).
140
See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Gerald Abraham,
Constitutional Limitations upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520, 535 (1963)
(“Even if the Fifth Amendment places restrictions of fairness upon the territorial reach of federal process, the
outer limits of fairness do not necessarily run along state borderlines.”).
141
See, e.g., Peay, 205 F.3d at 1212–13.
142
See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
143
See Fullerton, supra note 24, at 44–49 (discussing the state as the relevant geographical unit for fairness
analysis in this regard); id. at 49–52 (discussing the federal judicial district as the relevant geographical unit for
fairness analysis in this regard).
144
See Casad, supra note 20, at 1605 (describing the Court’s decision in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585 (1991), as an “indication that the Supreme Court majority places small importance on fairness in
forum selection”); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446–49 (1973) (constitutional to require indigent to pay
filing fee before gaining the benefits of declaring bankruptcy).
138
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the past.145 At least with respect to federal court litigation, concerns over being
forced to litigate in a distant court are mitigated by the virtual uniformity of the
federal courts across the county.146
None of this is to say that concerns of fairness relating to the location of
litigation within the sovereign’s borders should be irrelevant in deciding where
a defendant should have to litigate a case, or how a judicial system is designed.147
The point simply is that such concerns are not constitutionally required.
III. IN WHAT COURTS, AND KINDS OF CAUSES OF ACTION, MAY COURTS
APPLY NATIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION?
To the extent that national personal jurisdiction is constitutional at all, courts
and commentators agree that it is acceptable in the context of federal question
claims148 pending in federal court.149 But the language many of these courts and
commentators use to endorse the possibility of national personal jurisdiction in
this context suggests that this setting may be the only one where national
personal jurisdiction is possible.150 This Part considers the constitutional
propriety of national personal jurisdiction across various types of claims and
courts.
A. Federal Courts
There is a strong argument that personal jurisdiction is an aspect of judicial
power, and since the Constitution vests in Congress the authority to extend the
“federal judicial power” to the lower federal courts, Congress ought to be able
145

See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
See Fullerton, supra note 24, at 15 n.60 (acknowledging that fairness concerns faced by a defendant
having to litigate away from its home are ameliorated where the defendant can litigate in federal court, given the
generally uniform nature of the federal court system).
147
See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); Lilly, supra note 20, at 148, 148
n.240; Sachs, supra note 25, at 1325, 1333–40.
148
Article III of the Constitution authorizes Congress to confer upon the federal courts subject matter
jurisdiction over “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III. In turn, Congress
has conferred statutory federal question jurisdiction upon the federal district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
State courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over most claims that fall under federal question jurisdiction. See
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990).
149
See, e.g., Casad, supra note 20, at 1606.
150
See, e.g., United Rope Distribs., Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991) (“When
a national court applies national law, the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause requires only that the defendant possess
sufficient contacts with the United States.” (emphases added)); Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668,
671 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[T]here is no constitutional obstacle to nationwide service of process in the federal courts
in federal-question cases.” (emphasis added)).
146
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to grant the full extent of personal jurisdictional authority—that is, national
personal jurisdiction—with respect to any case that falls within the ambit of
Article III.151 Indeed, that is this Article’s ultimate conclusion with respect to all
types of Article III subject matter jurisdiction cases. However, both because of
statements suggesting that congressional power is limited to (or greater in)
federal question cases152 and because the counterarguments one encounters are
different in respect of the various types of subject matter jurisdiction, this Article
addresses each type of Article III subject matter jurisdiction separately in turn.
1. Causes of Action Under Federal Question Jurisdiction
The ability of Congress to endow the federal courts with national personal
jurisdiction with respect to federal question jurisdiction is relatively free from
controversy.153 Rule 4 currently allows for national personal jurisdiction under
certain circumstances in federal question cases.154 While it never came to pass,
the Rules Advisory Committee in the late 1980s contemplated making national
personal jurisdiction the rule rather than the exception in federal question
cases.155 An earlier American Law Institute (ALI) proposal was to similar
151
Assuming arguendo insofar as national personal jurisdiction would be unattainable had Congress opted
not to create any lower federal courts, the desire to keep open the option of national personal jurisdiction is
another reason for Congress to have created, and maintained, lower federal courts. The author is grateful to
Professor Robert Schapiro for this point.
152
See supra note 150.
153
See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 1, 39 (1987); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 45, at 1124 n.6; supra note 150. Professor Wendy Perdue
argues that, where a federal court asserts federal question jurisdiction, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
“constraints should be very modest and should not include the requirement of ‘purposeful availment.’” Perdue,
supra note 31, at 461. This argument—about whether nationwide contacts are appropriate, but rather the precise
way that existing tests for minimum contacts should be applied—lies beyond the scope of this Article.
154
See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
155
Under the 1989 proposal, Rule 4(e) would have allowed for “service upon an individual . . . in any
judicial district of the United States.” Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 127 F.R.D. 237, 273–74 (1989) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter 1989 Preliminary Draft]. Rule 4(f) would have provided for service upon an individual in a foreign
country. See id. at 274. Rule 4(h) would have offered similar treatment for defendant corporations and
associations. See id. at 276–77. Finally, Rule 4(l)(2) would have broadly authorized national personal
jurisdiction: “Unless a statute of the United States otherwise provides, or the Constitution in a specific
application otherwise requires, service of a summons or filing of a waiver of service is also effective to establish
jurisdiction over the person of any defendant against whom is asserted a claim arising under federal law.” Id. at
280–81. The proposal also suggested a statutory change to the federal question state:

If th[e] addition [of Rule 4(l)(2) is not] disapproved by the Congress, it is recommended that an
amendment should be made to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, adding words as follows: “The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States and, unless the Constitution in a specific application otherwise requires,
jurisdiction over the person of defendants in such actions.”
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effect.156 Clearly neither the Advisory Committee nor the ALI saw the
Constitution as an obstacle to ubiquitous national personal jurisdiction as to
federal question claims.
2. Causes of Action Under Supplemental Jurisdiction
To appreciate the niceties of whether national supplemental jurisdiction can
be constitutionally valid, it is analytically helpful to consider how supplemental
national personal jurisdiction might come into play in the first place.157 Consider
an attempt by a Georgia plaintiff to sue an Alaska defendant (or, equally, a
Russian defendant) without minimum contacts with Georgia, in Georgia federal
court on a state law claim. That attempt would ordinarily fail absent a valid
extension of national personal jurisdiction. But now consider the setting in which
that state law claim arises out of the same common nucleus of operative fact as
a federal law claim with respect to which Congress has authorized national
personal jurisdiction. May the federal district court, in asserting proper national
Id. at 266. With respect to proposed Rule 4(l)(2), the Advisory Committee notes explained:
Paragraph (l)(2) is an important addition authorizing the exercise of territorial jurisdiction over
the person of any defendant against whom is made a claim arising under federal law. This addition
is a companion to the amendments made in revised subdivisions (e) and (f) that provide for
service of a summons and complaint anywhere in the world . . . . This subdivision measures the
effectiveness of the service to establish jurisdiction over persons, and this paragraph (l)(2)
operates as a federal long-arm provision for claims arising under federal law. It extends the
federal reach in cases arising under federal law to the full extent allowed by the Fifth Amendment
and any applicable Congressional enactment.
Id. at 294–95. For a discussion of this proposed (but ultimately failed) amendment, see Casad, supra note 20, at
1598. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases: A
New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117 (1989).
156
The ALI’s 1969 proposal to revamp federal court jurisdiction included a suggested provision that
stated: “In civil actions in which jurisdiction is founded on [general federal question jurisdiction], service of
process upon any defendant may be made in any district.” ALI 1969 STUDY, supra note 80, at 31. The provision
would have been used to secure personal jurisdiction when another suggested provision would have made venue
proper in a federal question case in a district where “any defendant may be found, if there is no district within
the United States in which the action may otherwise be brought under this subsection.” Id. at 30; see id. at 32
(explanatory note); Casad, supra note 20, at 1597. In a memorandum accompanying the proposal (entitled: “The
constitutionality of service of federal court process without regard to state boundaries”), the ALI emphasized the
clear propriety of national personal jurisdiction: “We may put aside any question as to the validity of nationwide
service in cases involving the enforcement of federal law; indeed, it is difficult even to conceive of any reason
why Congress should not have this power in such cases.” ALI 1969 STUDY, supra note 80, at 437.
157
Many sources refer to the doctrine of supplemental personal jurisdiction instead as pendent personal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Simard, supra note 73, at 1621–27. Indeed, the Federal Practice and Procedure treatise
notes that its choice of the “pendent personal jurisdiction” moniker is a deliberate one: “[T]his section will refer
to ‘pendent personal jurisdiction’ rather than ‘supplemental personal jurisdiction’ to highlight the fact that
Section 1367 should not be read to subsume personal as well as subject matter jurisdiction.” WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 68, at § 1069.7. For a history of supplemental personal jurisdiction, see Simard, supra note 73, at
1632–42.
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personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to the federal law claim,
assert supplemental personal jurisdiction over the same defendant as to the state
law claim?158
Where a federal court has proper subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of
action (an “anchor claim”), the Constitution empowers Congress to authorize
the federal court to take jurisdiction over an entire constitutional “case or
controversy”—that is, in addition to the cause of action that properly falls under
federal jurisdiction, other causes of action that arise out of the same “common
nucleus of operative fact.”159 The Supreme Court has interpreted some statutes
conferring other forms of Article III jurisdiction on the federal district courts to
include grants of some quantum of supplemental jurisdiction.160 After the
Supreme Court questioned Congress’s ability to grant supplemental jurisdiction
as to causes of action involving parties not already parties to the anchor
claim161—so-called supplemental party jurisdiction—Congress in 1990 enacted
28 U.S.C. § 1367.162 Section 1367 grants federal district courts (subject to some
exceptions) “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”163
Statutory supplemental jurisdiction today explicitly extends to “claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”164
Courts and commentators have debated whether as a policy matter there
ought to be supplemental national personal jurisdiction,165 and also whether—to
158

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, at § 1069.7.
See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
160
See id.
161
See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549–56 (1989).
162
Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012)).
163
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
164
Id.
165
As discussed above, a 1989 version of a proposal by the Advisory Committee (which was not adopted
as written) would have generally authorized national personal jurisdiction in the federal district courts “over the
person of any defendant against whom is asserted a claim arising under federal law.” 1989 Preliminary Draft,
127 F.R.D. 237, 281 (1989) (draft of Rule 4(l)(2)). Examination of the record underlying this proposal reveals a
belief that such supplemental national personal jurisdiction should be limited, but for the most part for policy,
not constitutional, reasons. A 1988 version of the amendment would have made clear that, “[w]ith respect to
[nonfederal] claims, service of a summons shall not be effective to establish jurisdiction over the person or
property of a defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in
which the district court is held.” Jon Heller, Note, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of
Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 113, 117 n.36 (1989) (quoting Reporter’s Draft, FED. R. CIV. P. 4, Oct. 1, 1988). A
comment to the amendment further elucidated:
159

It is . . . not desirable to apply the principle [of pendent personal jurisdiction] to bring into the
federal court a related state claim which not only could not be separately litigation in a federal
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the extent there is supplemental national personal jurisdiction—that jurisdiction
is provided for by § 1367 or by federal common law,166 a point to which this
Article returns to below.167 For present purposes, it suffices to note that both
sides of both of these debates accept the constitutionality of supplemental
pendent personal jurisdiction. Those who believe that supplemental national
personal jurisdiction is inadvisable from a policy standpoint do not question its
constitutional validity. Rather, the consensus position is that supplemental
national personal jurisdiction is currently available,168 at least with respect to
claims that do not involve additional defendants as to whom personal
jurisdiction has not been established under an anchor claim.169 Current
court, but which also could not be asserted in the state court of general jurisdiction in the state in
which the federal court sits. To facilitate such double application of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction would provide an unwelcome incentive to plaintiffs to employ the revised rule to
secure jurisdiction in an inappropriate federal forum.
Id. The final 1989 proposal did not include the explicit carveout that appeared in the 1988 version, but the Notes
accompanying the proposal explained that the proposal was not intended to extend supplemental party national
personal jurisdiction:
The extension of the federal reach under this rule is . . . applicable only to defendants against
whom a federal claim is made, and does not apply to a defendant who is joined in the action only
by reason of that defendant’s possible liability for a state law claim that is pendent to a federal
claim.
1989 Preliminary Draft, 127 F.R.D. at 297. The Advisory Committee notes also echoed the position of the notes
that accompanied the 1988 version as to possible issues that may arise where pendent personal jurisdiction was
used to bring before the federal court a claim that could not be brought in that court or in the court of the state
in which the federal court sits. Id. at 298. It is only here that the Advisory Committee so much as alluded to any
constitutional issue with the exercise of supplemental national personal jurisdiction, and even then the
Committee was hardly committal that any constitutional problem necessarily existed:
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is, however, something less than a “general, allencompassing . . . rule”; it is a flexible tool of judicial administration. Additional caution should
be exercised in its use to bring into a federal court a state-law or foreign-law claim that could not
be otherwise presented either to a federal court or to a state court in the district in which the
federal court sits. There is a problem of fairness in the exercise of such “double-pendent”
jurisdiction.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976)). In short, the Advisory Committee’s
decision to recommend only limited supplemental national personal jurisdiction seems to have rested mostly on
policy considerations.
166
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, at § 1069.7. Compare Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund
v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 796, 804 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (noting that supplemental national personal
jurisdiction originates in § 1367), with United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting
that supplemental national personal jurisdiction is a common law doctrine), and WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68,
at § 1069.7 (noting the same).
167
See infra notes 306–09 and accompanying text.
168
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, at § 1069.7.
169
The doctrine of supplemental party personal jurisdiction is potentially problematic to the extent that
supplemental party jurisdiction is indeed a common law doctrine, given the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
analogous pre-§ 1367 common law doctrine of pendent party subject matter jurisdiction. Even while it has

NASH_FINALPROOFS2

2019]

1/30/2019 12:11 PM

NATIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION

539

understanding and practices, then, are entirely consistent with the
constitutionality of supplemental national personal jurisdiction.170
3. Causes of Action Under Diversity Jurisdiction
Despite statements suggesting that national personal jurisdiction is available
only in federal question cases,171 the fact is that national personal jurisdiction is
currently available in federal diversity cases. The federal interpleader statute and
the minimal diversity tort statute both rest on Article III’s diversity clause,172
and both statutes authorize nationwide service of process.173 Indeed, Rule
4(k)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (unlike Rule 4(k)(2))—which
authorizes federal courts to apply national personal jurisdiction “when
authorized by a federal statute”174—by its plain language is not restricted to
claims arising under federal law,175 and courts have applied it in the context of
federal statutes grounded on the Article III diversity grant.176 Thus, while courts
often state summarily that the reach of a federal district court’s personal
jurisdiction extends only as far as does the reach of a court of the state in which
the federal court sits, opinions that truly address the issue—and that lie at the
start of a string of cases that then state the conclusion unreflectingly—make clear
that it is only Rule 4(k)(1)(A)’s general rule, and not the Constitution, that
obligates federal district courts to mimic state courts in terms of personal

accepted the common law doctrine of pendent claim subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found a
presumption against a common law doctrine of pendent party subject matter jurisdiction. See Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545, 549–56 (1989); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Indeed,
it was the Finley decision that prompted Congress to codify supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367. See Richard D.
Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 446 (1991). Analogously, then, a common law doctrine of supplemental party
personal jurisdiction might similarly be presumptively invalid. By contrast, if § 1367 confers personal, as well
as subject matter, jurisdiction, then it presumably confers supplemental party personal, as well as supplemental
party subject matter, jurisdiction. Of course, even if federal district courts currently lack the ability to invoke
supplemental party personal jurisdiction—because it is unavailable as a common law doctrine, and § 1367 does
not confer it—that is simply because Congress has to date failed to confer it, not because the Constitution
precludes it.
170
See Simard, supra note 73, at 1642–45.
171
See supra note 150; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967)
(finding that, consistent with Article III, the federal interpleader statute requires only minimal diversity between
parties). But see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 45, at 1123 n.6 (suggesting that “federal standards” well
might govern personal jurisdiction in federal court “even in diversity litigation”).
172
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
173
See supra notes 99, 104.
174
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C).
175
See id.; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (confining its scope to “a claim that arises under federal law”).
176
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, at § 1068.1 n.75. So too is Rule 4(k)(1)’s provision for a 100-mile
bulge for service of additional parties not restricted to federal question cases. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B).
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jurisdiction.177 Indeed, the 1969 ALI proposal to revamp federal jurisdiction,
while recognizing that some might find the proposition of nationwide personal
jurisdiction more questionable in diversity than federal question cases, also
suggested that the propriety of national jurisdiction in diversity cases might in
the end be free from doubt.178
The biggest obstacle to the invocation of national personal jurisdiction to
diversity claims is the possible application of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins179 and
its progeny.180 That line of cases holds that, in order to avoid the “twin evils” of
inequitable administration of the laws and forum shopping,181 a federal diversity
court should apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits.182 There are
two arguments that shield national personal jurisdiction from Erie’s assault.
First, to the extent that Erie’s holding is simply a matter of how to interpret the
federal Rules of Decision Act properly,183 the Erie line poses no constitutional
obstacle to the introduction of national personal jurisdiction in diversity cases.
Second, notwithstanding Erie’s constitutional ramifications, national personal

177
For example, the Seventh Circuit in Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp. cursorily asserted: “It
is established in this circuit that a federal district court has personal jurisdiction over a party in a diversity case
only if a court of the state in which the district court is sitting would have such jurisdiction.” 726 F.2d 1209,
1212 (7th Cir. 1984). But for that proposition, the Deluxe Ice Cream Co. court cited Lakeside Bridge & Steel
Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1979), and the court in that case made clear
that Congress could extend nationwide personal jurisdiction in diversity cases. 726 F.2d at 1212.
178
See ALI 1969 STUDY, supra note 80, at 437 (“Limiting our inquiry to service of original process in
cases under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction presents the most arguable question—if indeed any is—for
in those cases where the applicable substantive law is that of the states, the justification for process across state
boundaries may be less apparent.”).
179
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
180
In a lone dissenting opinion in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, Justice Black relied on
Erie to argue that

[n]either the Federal Constitution nor any federal statute requires that a person who could not
constitutionally be compelled to submit himself to a state court’s jurisdiction forfeits that
constitutional right because he is sued in a Federal District Court acting for a state court solely
by reason of the happenstance of diversity jurisdiction.
375 U.S. 311, 331 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting). But in its memorandum on “[t]he constitutionality of service
of federal court process without regard to state boundaries” included in its 1969 proposal to revamp federal court
jurisdiction, the ALI Reporters—Professor Richard Field, Chief Reporter, Professor Paul Mishkin, Reporter
until 1965, Professor Charles Alan Wright, Reporter since 1963, and Professor David Shapiro, Assistant
Reporter—stated that they “d[id] not agree with the premise, seemingly implicit in Mr. Justice Black’s opinion,
that in diversity cases, the federal courts exercise only the judicial power of the several states, serving merely as
alternative impartial state tribunals.” ALI 1969 STUDY, supra note 80, at 439.
181
E.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941); Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.
182
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–80.
183
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652).
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jurisdiction is viable if it is satisfactorily a matter of procedural, not substantive,
law.
The Erie Court itself insisted that the holding was of a constitutional
nature.184 Commentators, however, have questioned the precise nature of the
constitutional holding, and indeed whether the holding has any constitutional
foundation at all.185 There is at least one aspect of the Erie line that might have
clear implications for the application of national personal jurisdiction: the notion
that a federal diversity court should apply the law of the state in which it sits.186
But, to the extent that Congress is constitutionally free to design federal trial
courts that extend across state lines and even simply to propound a single
national federal trial court,187 it surely cannot be a constitutional requirement
that a federal diversity court must apply the substantive law of the state in which
it sits.188 That said, there yet might be a constitutional strand of Erie that requires
184

See Erie, 304 U.S. at 77–78.
See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal
Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1421 (2017); cf. Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497,
504 (2001) (referring to Erie not as a decision of constitutional federalism, but rather as having established a
“federalism principle”). See generally Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV.
427, 437–48 (1958) (discussing possible constitutional and nonconstitutional holdings of Erie); Adam N.
Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (and What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial
Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 316 (2008) (identifying Erie’s “constitutional principle that Justice
Brandeis invoked but failed to articulate” as the notion that “federal judicial lawmaking cannot override
substantive rights where such lawmaking has only an adjudicative rationale”).
186
See, e.g., Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
187
See supra notes 82–88, 111–18 and accompanying text.
188
See Abraham, supra note 140, at 528; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1502 (2008); Nicolas, supra note 94,
at 1006–07 (detailing problems that ensue if the holding in Klaxon applies to cases pending within the portion
of Yellowstone National Park outside the state of Wyoming but nonetheless within the federal District of
Wyoming); Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001,
2027 (2008). In a memorandum entitled “[t]he constitutionality of authorizing independent federal determination
of choice of law in diversity of citizenship cases” accompanying its 1969 proposal to revamp federal jurisdiction,
the ALI explained:
185

It . . . seems clear . . . that Congress may authorize service of federal court process across state
lines. If, then, Congress may bring in defendants from states other than that in which the federal
court sits—or if it may provide for transfer of an action from a district in one state where the
parties were all served to a district court in another state—there can hardly be reason of
constitutional dimension for requiring the federal court to follow the choice-of-law rule of the
state in which it happens to be located. The point may perhaps be reinforced by noting that it is
in fact possible for Congress to locate the lawsuit in a federal court in a state that has no
substantive contact with the controversy . . . . If this is the case, there would seem no reason of
constitutional dimension why the judicial power of the United States should be less potent to
determine the choice of law than the judicial power of the state. And it would be especially
difficult to see why Congress would have power to bring to bear choice-of-law rules of states
having no substantive interest in the suit and yet not have power to authorize such federal rules.
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federal diversity courts to apply the substantive law of some state. And that could
pose an issue for national personal jurisdiction if that falls within the ambit of a
state’s substantive law for Erie purposes.
Assuming, then, there is some constitutional weight to Erie’s command,
does Erie analysis require federal diversity courts to adhere to state restrictions
on personal jurisdiction? The better answer to this question is that it does not.189
For one thing, as Professor Robert Abrams has argued, Article III can be read to
authorize congressional control over personal jurisdiction in diversity cases.190
Even applying traditional Erie analysis, it seems that personal jurisdiction
falls within the “procedural bucket” over which state law does not encroach. To
be sure, the extent of personal jurisdiction is in some sense outcome
determinative:191 After all, whether a defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction as to a claim can be the difference between a victory for the plaintiff
and a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.192 Still, the resulting invitation to
plaintiffs to choose a forum for litigation accordingly does not seem to be of the
type with which Erie and its progeny were concerned. Somewhat analogously,
a plaintiff who pursues a claim that falls within exclusive federal jurisdiction
will have that claim dismissed if she brings it in state court, without any
complaint of inequitable administration of the laws.
Moreover, there is a strong argument that, outcome determination
notwithstanding, the scope of personal jurisdiction is very much a matter of
procedural, not substantive, law.193 Lawyers and legal academics have long
understood service of process and jurisdiction to lie within the procedural realm.
Further confirming the procedural nature of personal jurisdiction is the fact
that it is a subject covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That means
that, in enacting Rule 4, the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, and
Congress all made a “prima facie judgment” that Rule 4 “transgresses neither
ALI 1969 STUDY, supra note 80, at 448.
189
The seminal statement on this point is found in Arrowsmith v. United Press International: “[T]he
constitutional doctrine announced in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins would not prevent Congress or its rule-making
delegate from authorizing a district court to assume jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an ordinary
diversity case although the state court would not . . . .” 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963) (citation omitted); see
also Lilly, supra note 20, at 141–42 (“[I]f the [alien] defendant’s national contacts were constitutionally
sufficient [under the Fifth Amendment], it seems consistent with ‘traditional notions of fair play’ to allow a
federal diversity court to exercise jurisdiction.”).
190
See Abrams, supra note 83, at 27.
191
See Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
192
See Abraham, supra note 140, at 528.
193
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.”194 It also means,
as the Court explained in Hanna v. Plumer,195 that the ordinary Erie analysis
does not apply.196 Rather, a court should only strike the Rule in the unlikely
event that it concludes that the prima facie judgment of the Advisory Committee,
the Supreme Court, and Congress about the Rule’s validity was erroneous.197
Only rarely have courts even seriously questioned the validity of a Rule of Civil
Procedure as improperly promulgated—let alone held that some portion of a
Rule is displaced by state law198—and it is perhaps especially instructive that the
Rule at issue in, and upheld in, Hanna was a part of Rule 4 itself—a provision
governing the method by which process can be served.199
None of this is to say that it would be wise from a policy perspective for
Congress (or its delegate) to extend national personal jurisdiction to diversity
cases.200 Indeed, when the Advisory Committee in 1989 proposed such
treatment for federal question cases,201 it explicitly declined to do so for diversity
cases.202 But the policy reasons that may mitigate against an action do not create
a constitutional barrier.
B. State Courts
Some question the common wisdom that congressional power to introduce
national personal jurisdiction is restricted to cases pending in the federal
courts.203 This section proceeds serially through the different kinds of claims
that might be pending in a state court as to which one might think Congress
might have the power to introduce national personal jurisdiction: federal
194

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
380 U.S. 460.
196
See id. at 469–70.
197
See id. at 471.
198
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, at § 4508.
199
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461.
200
See, e.g., United Rope Distribs., Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1991);
Casad, supra note 20.
201
See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1555–58 (2017) (concluding that federal statute did not
grant state courts nationwide personal jurisdiction, thus averting the need to confront the constitutional issue);
supra note 153.
202
See 1989 Preliminary Draft, 127 F.R.D. 237, 297 (1989) (“The extension of the federal reach [to
national limits] is inapplicable to cases in which federal jurisdiction rests on the diversity of citizenship of the
parties. This is perhaps a necessary application of the principle of Erie . . . .” (emphasis added)); Casad, supra
note 20, at 1598.
203
See supra note 150. But see Borchers, supra note 31 (“If Congress were to impose nationwide uniform
standards on state and federal courts any challenge to the constitutionality of these standards would implicate
the [F]ifth [A]mendment’s [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause, not the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment’s [D]ue [P]rocess
[C]lause, the current source of state court jurisdictional restrictions.” (emphasis added)).
195
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question cases, state law claims falling within the federal diversity jurisdiction,
and cases brought against foreign nonresident defendants. To the extent that
congressional power to extend national personal jurisdictional authority upon
the state courts, this section then considers the possibility of Congress instead
augmenting the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction. Since Congress has
greater power to extend national personal jurisdiction to the federal courts,
extending the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction provides Congress with
an end run around limits on the state courts’ freedom to exert national personal
jurisdiction.
1. Federal Question Cases
The Supreme Court has explained that unless Congress divests state courts
of jurisdiction, the state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
courts over federal questions claims.204 If Congress has the option of extending
national personal jurisdiction as to federal question claims pending in the federal
courts, does it have similar power as to federal question claims pending in the
state courts?
In fact, judging by the plain language of some statutes, Congress may have
done—though perhaps without intent—just that. Consider that the state courts
enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over claims under the federal securities laws, and
Congress has established national personal jurisdiction—without apparent
regard to whether a claim is brought in federal or state court—as to such
claims.205 Over the years, only three state courts appeared to have confronted the
issue at all. Two of them afforded the question little if any analytic attention, and
they reached opposite conclusions.206 The third confronted the question directly
and ultimately rejected the propriety of national personal jurisdiction, but on the
basis of statutory interpretation, not constitutional command.207

204

See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990).
See supra note 100.
206
Compare Negin v. Cico Oil & Gas Co., 46 Misc. 2d 367, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (rejecting
nationwide personal jurisdiction in a federal securities law case pending in state court even where personal
jurisdiction would have been proper were the case pending in federal court since, “[w]hile the [governing] statute
confers concurrent jurisdiction, yet jurisdiction in the State court is a State issue which is not overridden by
Federal venue”), with Lakewood Bank & Tr. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Cty. of San Mateo, 180 Cal. Rptr.
914, 917–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (implicitly finding appropriate national personal jurisdiction under securities
laws in state court, focusing instead on propriety of court’s subject matter jurisdiction).
207
See Kelly v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A 99C-09-265WCC, 2002 WL 88939, at *18–19 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2002) (finding nationwide personal jurisdiction under the securities laws unavailable in state
court, but as a matter of statutory construction, not constitutional analysis).
205
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There are several reasons to doubt Congress’s authority to augment the
personal jurisdictional reach of the state courts beyond the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment, even in federal question cases. “[P]ersonal jurisdiction
requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”208 Thus, as
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro
explains, the distinction between the state courts and the federal courts is critical
in determining the availability of national personal jurisdiction: “Because the
United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of any particular
State.”209
Such an approach squares with the logic that personal jurisdictional
restrictions originate with notions of sovereignty arising out of public
international law that were adopted by the Constitution,210 and then were refined
by the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Each state
is an individual sovereign, and the personal jurisdictional reach of its judiciary
depends upon the sovereignty of its home state. The United States is sovereign
over its own territory coextensively with the several states, and its judiciary
enjoys a reach based on that national sovereignty.
This logic notwithstanding, judges and commentators have advanced several
arguments in favor of congressional power to augment the reach of state courts
to the limits of the Fifth Amendment. These arguments are ultimately
unpersuasive. First, in a dissenting Third Circuit opinion, Judge John Gibbons
opined that, “were a state court adjudicating a federal claim, the relevant due
process should remain the [F]ifth [A]mendment” since “[t]he nature of the claim,
not the identity of the court, should determine the appropriate due process
test.”211 But Judge Gibbons’ suggestion that “the nature of the claim, not the
identity of the court, should determine the appropriate due process test” is
refuted by Justice Kennedy’s explanation that personal jurisdiction requires a
“sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”212 This logic also rebuffs Professor Graham
Lilly’s suggestion that International Shoe “purports only to invoke the due
process provision of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment to delimit the in personam
power that a state sovereign may confer upon its courts,”213 and “does not, other

208
209
210
211
212
213

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opinion).
Id.
See supra note 35.
DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 292 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884.
Lilly, supra note 20, at 148.
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than by possible implication, restrict Congress’s power to enlarge a state court’s
personal jurisdiction.”214
Professor Robert Casad points to examples of Congress announcing federal
standards for the reach of courts—both state and federal—that do not go as far
as state long-arm statutes,215 and then argues that, “if Congress can narrow the
range of state court jurisdiction in federal question cases, it surely can enlarge it
as well.”216 This syllogism is faulty: A decision by Congress to reduce the reach
of a state court’s personal jurisdiction is a decision in effect to divest the court
of jurisdiction over certain claims, and that is a decision that clearly lies within
congressional power.217 But the decision to extend a state court’s jurisdiction is
quite different and lies, it seems, beyond congressional power.218
Some commentators invoke the Supreme Court’s holding in Testa v.
Katt219—that the Supremacy Clause obligates state courts to hear federal claims
to the extent that they hear analogous claims under state law220—to argue that
state courts would be bound by—indeed, required to execute—a congressional
decision to enlarge their personal jurisdictional reach to the extent of the Fifth
Amendment.221 This argument, while facially appealing, is ultimately
unavailing.
Testa dealt with an attempt by a state court system to frustrate Congress’s
effort to vest the state courts with subject matter jurisdiction over a federal law
cause of action.222 Thus, Testa and its progeny teach that action by Congress to
vest in the state courts concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims is not an
enlargement of the state courts’ jurisdiction; rather, the attempt by a state court
to decline to hear a federal claim when it readily hears similar state claims is an
effort by the state court improperly to constrain its jurisdiction. In contrast, an
effort by Congress to expand state courts’ personal jurisdiction to the extent of
the Fifth Amendment would effectively expand the set of claims that state courts
could hear. Testa offers no support for such an expansion.
214

Id.
See Casad, supra note 20, at 1616.
216
Id.; see also Adams, supra note 29, at 85–89 (making a similar argument).
217
See, e.g., Sparks v. Caldwell, 723 P.2d 244, 245 (N.M. 1986) (holding that a long-arm statute under
federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act validly preempts state long-arm statute).
218
Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 56 (1912) (questioning the power of
Congress “to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts”).
219
330 U.S. 386 (1947).
220
Id. at 394.
221
See Casad, supra note 20, at 1616; Lilly, supra note 20, at 148; Packel, supra note 29, at 925–26;
Carlebach, Note, supra note 29, at 245.
222
Testa, 330 U.S. at 387–88.
215
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Even more problematically, were Testa read to recognize congressional
power to authorize (or even require) states to exercise national personal
jurisdiction, then Testa would effectively empower Congress to authorize states
to violate the Constitution. But no provision of the Constitution—including the
Supremacy Clause, on which Testa rests—conveys such authority on the federal
government.
An attempt by Congress to expand state court personal jurisdiction to the
Fifth Amendment limits is well analyzed under the so-called “reverse-Erie”
rubric.223 In an Erie setting, a federal court is called upon to apply state
substantive law; in a reverse-Erie setting, a state court is called upon to apply
federal substantive law. However, the limit on personal jurisdiction is better
categorized as procedural rather than substantive.224 And, just as under Erie a
federal court should apply federal procedural law, so too as a general matter
should a state court under reverse-Erie apply state procedural law.
To be sure, the federal judiciary enjoys a power advantage over the state
judiciaries,225 such that federal procedural law may intrude more into state court
litigation under reverse-Erie than state procedural law intrudes into federal court
litigation under Erie. For example, while the Supreme Court has held that a
federal diversity court should ignore a state law requirement of a bench trial and
instead administer a jury trial226 under Erie and not because of the Seventh
Amendment’s command,227 the Court reached the opposite result in the reverseErie setting. In Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co.,228 the Supreme
Court ruled that the federal requirement of a jury trial applied when a state court
heard a federal claim; even though the Seventh Amendment was itself
inapplicable, strong federal policy favored exporting the jury trial requirement
to state court.229 It seems unlikely, by contrast, that the federal policy behind
expanding personal jurisdiction is entitled to similar weight.
Finally, one might think perhaps that Congress has power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to alter the application of International Shoe to

223
See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006) (explaining inter
alia the process of “reverse-Erie” analysis).
224
See supra notes 191–99 and accompanying text.
225
See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication, 94 VA. L. REV. 1869,
1904 (2008).
226
See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1958).
227
Id. at 537 n.10.
228
342 U.S. 359 (1952).
229
Id. at 363.
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the state courts.230 This argument suffers from two defects. First, the Court has
required evidence of historic state discrimination violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment before validating congressional enforcement legislation;231 there
seems to be no such evidence here. Second, enabling state courts to exercise
national personal jurisdiction would increase state power and decrease
individual liberty interests—quite the opposite of what one would expect of a
typical exercise by Congress of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
2. Cases that Fall Within the Federal Diversity Jurisdiction
Surely if Congress lacks power to extend the personal jurisdictional reach of
state courts as to federal claims,232 it must a fortiori lack such power as to state
law claims. The federal interest in having state courts hear state law claims is far
less than the corresponding federal interest for federal law claims.233
Even assuming Congress does have the power to expand the reach of state
court personal jurisdiction to the limits of the Fifth Amendment with respect to
federal law claims, does it have the same power with respect to state law claims
that fall within the federal diversity grant?234 Professor Lilly has argued that, just
as “control over interstate and international commerce” and “authority in the
foreign relations field” provide Congress a basis for introducing national
personal jurisdiction in the state courts as to federal claims,235 Congress in doing
the same with respect to state law claims that fall under the diversity grant
“would simply be granting, as ‘necessary and proper’ to its conferral of
expanded personal jurisdiction upon a federal court, coordinate in personam
jurisdiction to a state court.”236 Professor Lilly concludes: “If this grant did not
obligate, but only empowered, the courts of a state to expand their in personam
reach, the resulting scheme would not compromise state sovereignty, and should
fall within the outer limits of congressional power.”237
This argument is unconvincing. Even if the logic of Testa somehow extends
to give Congress the power to grant (indeed, require) state courts to apply Fifth
Amendment-based personal jurisdictional limits in federal question cases, Testa
230

See Borchers, supra note 31, at 154–55; Casad, supra note 20, at 1620.
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645–46 (1999).
232
See supra Section III.B.1.
233
See, e.g., Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987).
234
It seems clear that Congress lacks power as to claims pending in state court that fall within neither the
federal question grant nor the diversity grant.
235
Lilly, supra note 20, at 148.
236
Id. at 149.
237
Id.
231
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and its progeny have never come close to suggesting that Congress has the power
to impart to state courts the power to exercise a federal procedural standard in
state law cases. Professor Lilly’s invocation of the Necessary and Proper Clause
in the abstract seems manifestly insufficient to compensate for the lack of
constitutional authorization.
Finally, the policies underlying the relevant constitutional provisions
confirm the logic of restricting national personal jurisdiction to those diversity
and alienage cases pending in federal court. A primary motive behind federal
diversity and alienage subject matter jurisdiction is to protect the interests of
defendants by providing them an opportunity to have their cases heard in a
federal forum. On the other hand, the motive behind national personal
jurisdiction is to protect the interests of plaintiffs by providing them with an
opportunity to sue defendants notwithstanding possible ramifications for foreign
relations in cases involving foreign defendants, and possible ramifications for
interstate relations in cases involving domestic defendants. In particular, the
introduction of expansive national personal jurisdiction runs the risk of straining
U.S. foreign relations. On balance, then, it makes sense to restrict the exercise
of national personal jurisdiction to diversity and alienage cases pending in the
federal courts.238
3. Cases Brought Against Foreign Nonresident Defendants
While numerous commentators have argued over the years that Congress for
various reasons can extend national personal jurisdiction as to claims brought
against foreign nonresident defendants in the federal courts,239 two pairs of
commentators—Professor Ronan Degnan and Dean Mary Kay Kane and,
recently, Professors William Dodge and Scott Dodson—have argued that
Congress has that same power even as to claims brought in the state courts and
thus regardless of the type of claim.240 They argue in essence that, as to foreign
nonresident defendants, the Fourteenth Amendment protects liberty interests
only on the basis of national contacts.241

238

This author is grateful to Robert Schapiro for this point.
See supra note 150.
240
See Degnan & Kane, supra note 32; Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32. Professor Gary Born advances
the more muted position that, while the Constitution allows federal courts to exercise nationwide minimum
contacts as to foreign nonresident defendants, it allows state courts more leeway in exercising personal
jurisdiction but does not permit state courts to exercise full-blown nationwide minimum contacts. See Born,
supra note 153, at 42.
241
See Degnan & Kane, supra note 32, at 813–14.
239
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While carefully crafted and thought-provoking, the argument is
unconvincing for at least three reasons. First, the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment extends less minimum contacts protection to aliens finds no support
in existing precedent. To be sure, as Professor Degnan and Dean Kane, and
Professors Dodge and Dodson, note,242 the Court has indicated that the
Fourteenth Amendment calculus might differ when applied to foreign, as
opposed to domestic, defendants. But the fact is that the Court has only relied
upon such a distinction (i) to provide greater protection for foreign
defendants,243 not to narrow foreign defendants’ due process protections, as
applying a national standard would do, and (ii) in the context of the more
discretionary fairness prong rather than the minimum contacts prong that
functions more as an “on-off” switch for personal jurisdiction. In Asahi Metal
Industries Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County,244 the Court was
unable to agree on the proper stream of commerce analysis for minimum
contacts purposes,245 but did agree that fairness concerns weighed heavily
against personal jurisdiction where the only parties remaining in the case—the

242
See id. at 809–11 (discussing Asahi’s emphasis on the importance of the alien status of the
defendant/third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant); Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1215.
243
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141 (2014) (reasoning, based on the fact that other nations
balk at an “uninhibited approach” to general jurisdiction, that a broad approach to general jurisdiction runs afoul
of “the ‘fair play and substantial justice’ due process demands” and thus “reinforce[d]” the Court’s conclusion—
based primarily on traditional minimum contacts analysis—that the foreign corporation was not subject to
general jurisdiction in California); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102,
114 (1987) (plurality opinion) (finding absence of personal jurisdiction where “[a]ll that remain[ed]” in the case
was “a claim for indemnification asserted by . . . a Taiwanese corporation” against a Japanese corporation). For
a critical assessment, see Parrish, supra note 37, at 33 (“Aliens abroad with no connection to the United States
have no constitutional rights but, under current personal jurisdictional law, paradoxically have the strongest
claim that the Due Process Clause prohibits a U.S. court from asserting jurisdiction over them.”). Outside of
governing Supreme Court opinions, there is some endorsement of the notion that the Constitution should
somehow afford less protection to foreign nonresident defendants. In her dissenting opinion in McIntyre, Justice
Ginsburg argued that “[t]he Court’s judgment . . . puts United States plaintiffs at a disadvantage in comparison
to similarly situated complainants elsewhere in the world.” 564 U.S. 873, 909 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
That opinion attracted only two of her colleagues. Id. at 893. And Professor Perdue has argued that the
“purposeful availment” should not apply to restrict jurisdiction when suit is brought in federal court under federal
law against a foreign nonresident defendant. See supra note 153; cf. Parrish, supra note 37 (arguing that foreign
nonresident defendants should be able to invoke sovereignty-based, but not liberty-based, aspects of Fourteenth
Amendment personal jurisdiction limitations, but also that the result of heightened responses to sovereigntybased objections would be that “courts would exercise jurisdiction in fewer instances, even when minimum
contacts are met”).
244
480 U.S. 102.
245
Compare id. at 108–13 (arguing in favor of more stringent standard for stream of commerce), with id.
at 116–21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing in favor of a laxer standard),
and id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the precise
contours of stream of commerce standard could await another day and that in any event the plurality misapplied
its own standard).
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third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant—were both foreign.246 And,
in Daimler AG v. Bauman,247 the Court recited that the fact that other nations
balk at an “uninhibited approach” to general jurisdiction made a broad approach
to general jurisdiction run afoul of “the ‘fair play and substantial justice’ due
process demands.”248 This conclusion about fairness, the Court said,
“reinforce[d]” the Court’s conclusion—based primarily on minimum contacts—
that the foreign corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in
California.249 In both these cases, then, the Court found that litigants’ status as
aliens served to narrow the reach of personal jurisdiction; and in neither of these
cases did the Court suggest that alien status would affect the minimum contacts
portion of the Fourteenth Amendment analysis.250
Professors Dodge and Dodson argue that, “[w]ith respect to the proper forum
for assessing minimum contacts, the [J]ustices in McIntyre appeared willing to
recognize the unique influences of a defendant’s alienage status,” although “no
position commanded a majority.”251 Professors Dodson and Dodge correctly
note that the dissent explicitly “would have taken the defendant’s alienage status
into account in determining whether its conduct had met the minimum-contacts
test.”252 But they mischaracterize the positions of the plurality and concurring
Justices. Professors Dodson and Dodge accurately quote Justice Kennedy’s
plurality opinion statement that a foreign defendant “may have the requisite
relationship with the United States Government but not with the government of
any individual State[,]”253 but their argument ignores the fact that this statement
comes in the context of a discussion of the personal jurisdictional reach of the
federal, as opposed to the state, courts.254 Finally, while the two concurring
Justices were perhaps open to looking at contacts with the entire United States
for some foreign defendants, they were—as Professors Dodson and Dodge

246

See id. at 113–16 (plurality opinion).
571 U.S. 117.
248
Id. at 142 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
249
Id.
250
It does seem that alien status determined the outcome in Asahi, but that is because there remained in
the case no domestic litigant. See 480 U.S. at 113–16. The broad use of the case to argue that the presence of an
alien affects the personal jurisdiction analysis is thus dubious.
251
Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1216.
252
Id.; see J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[N]o issue
of the fair and reasonable allocation of adjudicatory authority among States of the United States is present in this
case. New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose dangerous product
caused a workplace injury in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or diminish the sovereignty, of any sister
State.”).
253
Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1216 (quoting McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion)).
254
See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884–85.
247
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concede255—explicitly unwilling to adopt a broad rule to that effect for all
foreign defendants.256 In short, despite Professors Dodson and Dodge’s claim,257
a majority of the Justices in McIntyre seem to have rejected a broad rule that the
relevant contacts for foreign defendants are contacts with the whole United
States.
A second flaw with the argument in favor of considering minimum contacts
with the whole United States for foreign defendants is that such a rule is
consistent with neither of the two justifications for Fourteenth Amendment
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Professors Dodson and Dodge argue, to the
contrary, that fairness and federalism both are consistent with national contacts
in the Fourteenth Amendment context. In the context of fairness, they argue that,
for alien defendants, “the particular state forum is largely irrelevant.”258 But their
support for this contention is overinclusive. They explain that (i) ”[w]hatever
interstate differences exist among U.S. courts is of little concern to alien
defendants in light of the stark differences between litigation”;259 (ii) ”for the
most part, aliens are far more concerned about the travel costs and burdens of
litigating in America generally than in a particular state”;260 and (iii) ”many
aliens engaged in commercial enterprises treat the United States as a single
market rather than a state-specific market.”261 But these points are not
universally true for foreign defendants, as indeed Professors Dodge and Dodson
concede for points two and three.262 A small business based in Ciudad Juarez
doing business across the Rio Grande in Texas might be well-versed in Texas
law as compared to the law of other states (and the gulf between legal systems
would be considerably smaller for a small business in Windsor, Ontario doing
business across the Detroit River from Detroit). Both these small businesses
would likely disagree vehemently with the notion that they were indifferent as
to burdens of litigating in various U.S. states, and likely would not treat the U.S.
255
See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1217 (“[T]he concurrence expressed general concern with the
difficulty of crafting a general rule in light of the uncertainties of specific applications.”).
256
See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 887 (Breyer, J., concurring).
257
See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1217 (“The end result of McIntyre is that whether and how the
alienage status of a defendant affects the minimum-contacts prong of specific jurisdiction remains unsettled.”).
258
Id. at 1224. While Professors Dodge and Dodson argue that foreign nonresident defendants are simply
unconcerned with the choice of state forum, Dean Parrish argues that considerations of foreign nonresident
defendants’ liberty interests (even if they have such preferences) should be per se irrelevant to the Due Process
analysis. See Parrish, supra note 37, at 54.
259
Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1224.
260
Id. at 1224.
261
Id. at 1224–25.
262
See Born, supra note 153, at 41 (“[W]hile foreign defendants will have a comparatively weak interest
in litigating in one United States forum rather than another, in certain cases they may have some such
preferences.” (footnote omitted)).

NASH_FINALPROOFS2

2019]

1/30/2019 12:11 PM

NATIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION

553

as a single market.263 Professors Dodge and Dodson’s argument seems to
generalize on the assumption that all foreign defendants are multinational
corporations. But just as the features of U.S. national corporations do not
generate a fair one-size-fits-all jurisdictional test for domestic defendants,
neither do the features of transnational corporations generate a fair one-size-fitsall jurisdictional test for foreign defendants.264
With respect to federalism, Professors Dodge and Dodson assert that the
interstate federalism concerns that motivate, in part, Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence “arise only if the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in a
U.S. state.”265 While they acknowledge that “a national-contacts approach does
enlarge the number of courts that could assert personal jurisdiction over an alien
defendant,”266 they assert that, “unlike a domestic defendant, an alien defendant
is not ‘at home’ in any U.S. state, and thus a state’s assertion of specific
jurisdiction over the alien cannot intrude on any home state’s authority.”267 But
“enlarg[ing] the number of courts that could assert personal jurisdiction over an
alien defendant”268 likely will result (by increasing forum shopping) in a
reduction in the number of cases over which courts in states with specific
jurisdiction under a state-based minimum-contacts approach will preside.
Professors Dodge and Dodson discount this point, arguing that a state with no
relevant connection to a dispute (i) ”would be constitutionally prohibited from
applying [its own] substantive law;”269 (ii) would “almost certainly” apply the
263
Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 892 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“[M]anufacturers come in many shapes and sizes. It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small
Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer, selling its products
through international distributors, to respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in the United
States, even those in respect to which the foreign firm has no connection at all but the sale of a single (allegedly
defective) good.”).
264
Professors Dodge and Dodson further argue that it is acceptable not to factor in the burdens to foreign
defendants of litigating in particular U.S. forums since “the reasonableness component of personal-jurisdiction
doctrine already accounts for these burdens on alien defendants.” Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1227. It
is a strange argument indeed that, essentially, the vast increase in personal jurisdiction that a move to a national
minimum contacts standard for foreign defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment would in effect be
somewhat offset by the increased protection—i.e., the decrease in jurisdiction reach—afforded to aliens under
the fairness portion of the Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
265
Id. at 1230; accord Born, supra note 153, at 41; Toran, supra note 20, at 772. But see Recent Case,
Civil Procedure—Personal Jurisdiction—Second Circuit Reverses Anti-Terrorism Act Judgment for Foreign
Terror Attack.—Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV.
1488, 1493 (2017) (“[F]ederalism justifications do not apply to cases governed by the Fifth Amendment, where
federal law applies uniformly and it is the authority of the United States government itself that matters.”
(emphasis added)).
266
Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1231.
267
Id. at 1230.
268
Id. at 1231.
269
Id.
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law of the state where the dispute arose (i.e., the law of the state that would,
under a state-specific minimum-contacts approach, have specific
jurisdiction);270 and (iii) ”would almost certainly not adjudicate the dispute in
the end but would instead dismiss the suit under [the] doctrine of forum non
conveniens.”271 The problem is that the latter two points are girded in
subconstitutional legal doctrine: Professors Dodge and Dodson ground the
second proposition on the (logical but subconstitutional) assumption that the
state has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws,272 while the
third assumption rests on the subconstitutional doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Thus, a state could constitutionally decline to invoke the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and, even if it could not constitutionally apply its own
law, could constitutionally apply the law of a state other than the one where the
dispute arose. The interests of the state where the dispute arose are thus protected
only subconstitutionally, and subconstitutional protections are insufficient to
vindicate constitutionally protected interests.
A third, overarching problem with the argument in favor of applying
minimum contacts with the whole United States for foreign defendants is that—
even to the extent that Professor Degnan and Dean Kane, and Professors Dodge
and Dodson, are correct that the Fourteenth Amendment may under some
circumstances afford foreign defendants less protection than their domestic
counterparts—it nevertheless is incongruous that whatever protection the
Fourteenth Amendment does provide should be wholly detached from state
sovereignty. Professor Degnan and Dean Kane assert that “[q]uite obviously
neither Germany nor Germans can claim any benefits that are accorded to the
State of New York or to persons because they are in or are from New York.”273
Yet the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is clearly addressed to the
“states,”274 and, to the extent that sovereignty limits originate in international
law principles that the Constitution incorporated, those limits apply to the states
as sovereign entities. In short, it is hard to understand exactly how state
sovereignty—which remains a fundamental basis for Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process personal jurisdiction jurisprudence275—can be vindicated when the
relevant contacts are with the entire United States. If indeed foreign defendants
270

Id.
Id. at 1232. Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine under which a court “may dismiss an
action on the ground that a court abroad is the more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the
controversy.” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
272
See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1231 n.169.
273
Degnan & Kane, supra note 32, at 814.
274
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Sachs, supra note 25, at 1318.
275
See supra note 8.
271
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qualify as “persons” for Fourteenth Amendment purposes—a point that
Supreme Court precedent clearly endorses, and a point with which neither
Professor Degnan and Dean Kane, nor Professors Dodge and Dodson, take
issue276—then foreign defendants ought to enjoy some measure of protection
based upon the sovereignty of the states, not just the federal government.
4. The Option of Expanding Federal Court Original Jurisdiction
If Congress lacks power to authorize state courts to exercise Fifth
Amendment-based personal jurisdictional limits, it does have the power to
expand the original subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to the
constitutional limit277 so that as many plaintiffs as constitutionally possible have
the option of filing suit in federal court, where national personal jurisdiction can
be made readily available.278 For federal question jurisdiction, Congress has
largely done this already: The current grant of statutory federal question
jurisdiction has no amount in controversy requirement.279 Congress could also
eliminate or limit the well-pleaded complaint rule,280 although that would admit
cases to federal court based on defenses that the defendant might not in the end
plead.281
With respect to diversity jurisdiction, Congress has the option of reducing or
removing the amount in controversy requirement and/or requiring only minimal
diversity. To avoid opening the federal litigation floodgates too wide, it could
do this only with respect to cases where national personal jurisdiction is
appropriate. Indeed, that is precisely what Congress already has done in its
extension of jurisdiction in minimal diversity cases arising out of mass
accidents.282
Congress would have to be more inventive about extending federal court
jurisdiction with respect to run-of-the-mill state law cases that do not fall under
276

See Degnan & Kane, supra note 32, at 813; Dodge & Dodson, supra note 32, at 1221–22.
Congress has analogous power with respect to the federal district courts’ removal jurisdiction, but the
expansion of removal jurisdiction would not be helpful in this context. A plaintiff who knew that she could only
obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant in federal court needs original jurisdiction to sue there in the first
place. And, if a plaintiff erred and sued a defendant in state court where there was no jurisdiction, removal (if it
were available) would be counter to the defendant’s interests.
278
See supra Section III.A.
279
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
280
See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1908).
281
See Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 546 n.129 (2012) (discussing federal defense removal and similar
possibilities).
282
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
277
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Article III’s diversity grant. One possibility—at least for contracts cases that
implicate interstate commerce (e.g., contracts cases involving merchants)—
could be for Congress to advert to protective jurisdiction.283 The logic
underlying protective jurisdiction is that, if Congress has the constitutional
authority to regulate a field, it surely has the lesser power simply to extend
federal jurisdiction to claims in that field, leaving state law to supply the rules
of decision.284 As applied here, one can argue that, though it has never exercised
it, Congress has the power to enact a federal contracts law at least with respect
to contracts that implicate interstate commerce. If that is so, then Congress
could, under the logic of protective jurisdiction, (i) open the federal courthouse
doors to claims arising out of such contracts, (ii) grant the federal courts national
personal jurisdiction in such cases (or a subset of such cases), and (iii) leave state
law as the substantive law governing such cases. The viability of such a strategy
is unclear, insofar as the Court has never approved of the protective
jurisdiction.285 Congress might be on safer constitutional ground but end up
more at risk of offending state legislatures and judiciaries ordinarily used to
regulating the law of contracts by simply converting these claims into ones
arising under federal law by enacting a federal version of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
A final strategy would be for Congress to enact a statute that, in return for
permission to “do business” within the United States, extracts from foreign
corporations “consent” to national personal jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction in any
court of the United States. Some states have analogously endeavored to obtain
consent to jurisdiction in state courts,286 but commentators have observed that
such state efforts may be constitutionally suspect—under the Due Process
Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause, and the doctrine of foreign affairs
preemption287—and courts have viewed such efforts with suspicion, especially
in the wake of Goodyear and Daimler.288 Whatever the merits of these concerns,
283
See Casad, supra note 20, at 1620 (noting the potential promise of “the uncharted waters of ‘protective
jurisdiction’” in this regard, but with Professor Casad concluding that “[he was] not prepared to embark on that
voyage at [that] time”).
284
See, e.g., 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 21
(2d ed. 2011).
285
See id.
286
See Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1363–71 (2015); Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding General Personal Jurisdiction over
Transnational Corporations for Federal Causes of Action, 121 PENN. ST. L. REV. 617, 673–74 (2017).
287
See Monestier, supra note 286, at 1372–1413.
288
See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 633–41 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding a Connecticut
statute ambiguous and interpreting it to obtain consent for jurisdiction as to claims arising out of a corporation’s
contacts with the state (i.e., specific jurisdiction), not general jurisdiction, in order to avoid constitutional
concerns).
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an effort by Congress to extract consent would certainly, as Professor Gwynne
Skinner argues, quell concerns of violating the dormant Commerce Clause and
of running afoul of foreign affairs preemption,289 leaving only the concern of
whether the “consent” thus obtained is sufficiently voluntary to satisfy the Due
Process Clause. In any event, it is unclear whether Congress would opt to require
consent to nationwide jurisdiction, or instead exercise the lesser power of
requiring consent to suit merely in some particular state, especially a state of the
foreign corporation’s choosing.290
***
In sum, Congress likely has authority to confer on the federal courts national
personal jurisdiction as to claims brought under federal question, supplemental,
and diversity jurisdiction. In contrast, Congress likely lacks such authority with
respect to claims brought in the state courts.
IV. WHAT STEPS (IF ANY) MUST CONGRESS TAKE TO EFFECT NATIONAL
PERSONAL JURISDICTION?
If there is no constitutional impediment to the introduction of national
personal jurisdiction in at least some forums and with respect to at least some
categories of cases, what steps must Congress take to introduce it? The instances
of national personal jurisdiction we have seen to this point highlight two ways
for it to arise. First, Congress itself has enacted a few statutes that authorize it.291
Second, congressional delegates have exercised their rulemaking power292 to
authorize it.293
289

See Skinner, supra note 286, at 674.
To the extent that conditions attach to the government’s efforts to coerce waiver of a foreign defendant
corporation’s personal jurisdictional due process rights, cf. Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 801, 806–07 (2003) (describing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, under which the government is
limited in its ability to coerce an individual to waive his or her constitutional rights in exchange for some
government benefit), one could imagine a court invalidating the statutory extraction of consent for nationwide
jurisdiction on the ground that it was not narrowly tailored to the goal of ensuring that domestic plaintiffs have
a U.S. forum in which they can sue a defendant foreign corporation. After all, consent merely to general
jurisdiction in some particular state (even of the corporation’s choosing) should suffice to address the problem
of domestic plaintiffs potentially not having a domestic forum in which to sue the corporation.
291
See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
292
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
293
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). Some commentators argue that the nondelegation doctrine—the
notion that the power of Congress to delegate legislative power on an Executive Branch actor absent some
“intelligible principle” to guide the Executive’s discretion—applies to delegations to the judiciary. See Whitman
V. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially
Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 421–60 (2008); Aaron Nielson,
Erie as Nondelegation, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 266–70 (2011); Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman’s March (in)to the
290
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But must Congress take any step at all, or can the federal courts themselves
authorize national personal jurisdiction? In other words, is common law action
sufficient to render applicable national minimum contacts?
Before proceeding, it is well to take note of two distinct types of federal
common law. The first—so-called “interstitial federal common law”—arises
when a federal court announces law to fill in gaps in existing federal statutes or
rules. The second—to which we might refer as “pure federal common law”—
arises when a federal court, much as would a state court, simply announces law,
with no particular basis in existing federal statutes or rules. The latter is seen
potentially to run afoul of Erie’s directive that “[t]here is no federal general
common law,”294 while the former is quite acceptable.295
Many courts and commentators invoke the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd.296 to conclude that
common law cannot be a basis for personal jurisdiction—and in particular for
national personal jurisdiction.297 However, despite courts and commentators’
reliance on Omni, and though the Omni Court expressed great skepticism about
the federal courts’ common law power to generate personal jurisdiction
standards, that case does not slam the door on the possibility of common law-

Sea, 74 TENN. L. REV. 319, 371–75 (2007); Volokh, supra note 185, at 1410–14. Professor Alexander Volokh
has further argued that the doctrine incorporates the “Inherent Powers Corollary,” that is, the notion that the
nondelegation doctrine’s requirement of an “intelligible principle” does not apply where Congress delegates in
an area that lies within (or is “interlinked” with) powers that the delegate already has. Id. at 1405–06. To the
extent that developing limits on personal jurisdiction seems properly to lie within the judicial role, such a
delegation would seem beyond reproach. But see Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S.
97, 108 (1987) (“At common law, a court lacked authority to issue process outside its district . . . .”).
A separate question is whether the delegation of authority to extend national personal jurisdiction is
consistent with the Rules Enabling Act as currently drafted. The general wisdom is that it is, with Rule 4(k)(2)
being one such example. See Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 733, 744 (1988) (noting the issue, while suggesting it likely had been resolved). Still, the issue is
not free from doubt. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a “Substantive Right”: The Invalidity
of Rule 4(k) Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 IND. L.J. 1191, 1223–28 (2000) (arguing that such delegations
impermissibly alter substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act); see also ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 339 (2018), http://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/2018-04-civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf (“[P]ast Committees have concluded that the
Enabling Act authorizes rules that expand personal jurisdiction by providing for service of process outside the
court’s district or state. . . . The question, however, deserves careful attention.”).
294
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
295
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, at § 4514.
296
484 U.S. 97.
297
See, e.g., United Rope Distribs., Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532, 534–35 (7th Cir.
1991); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68; Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal
Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929 (1996); Casad, supra note 20, at 1594–95; Degnan & Kane, supra note 32, at 806
n.31.
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based personal jurisdiction standards.298 First, the Court cited a 1925 case—
Robertson v. R.R. Labor Board299—in which it had noted that pre-constitutional
common law did not grant courts power over personal jurisdiction, and that the
first Judiciary Act continued that tradition.300 But the Court allowed for the
possibility that “the bases for the rule in Robertson are no longer valid.”301
Beyond this, the Court observed that, in order to conclude that it had
common law authority, it would have to decide that the existing provisions of
Rule 4, “in authorizing service in certain circumstances, were not intended to
prohibit service in all other circumstances.”302 Were this the case, this would be
a subconstitutional impediment to common lawmaking authority; it would mean
that common law personal jurisdiction as requested by the plaintiff in the case
at bar would be inconsistent with the existing rule-based architecture,303 not that
courts would in all cases lack common lawmaking power. The Court also noted
a final prerequisite to proceeding via common law: “We would also have to find
adequate authority for common-law rulemaking.”304
In the end, however, the Omni Court concluded that it need not rule on these
ancillary issues, “since [it] would not fashion a rule for service in this litigation
even if [it] had the power to do so.”305 Thus, the Court never held that the
Constitution precludes federal courts from promulgating common law-based
standards for personal jurisdiction.
Indeed, there is currently a form of common law national personal
jurisdiction according to many courts and commentators. Consider the doctrine
of supplemental national personal jurisdiction. There is an argument that § 1367
today confers on federal courts supplemental national personal jurisdiction, at
least where a statutory scheme that confers original jurisdiction also conveys

298
See Lusardi, supra note 24, at 2 n.5, 5 n.17; Michael E. Solimine, Enforcement and Interpretation of
Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 295, 317 (1988); see also Vazquez-Robles v.
CommoLoCo, Inc., 757 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that the Court’s decision in Omni did not preclude the
possibility of a common law rule, but merely “strongly reinforces our reluctance to recognize a method of service
of process not described in any Puerto Rico statute or procedural rule”).
299
268 U.S. 619 (1925).
300
Omni, 484 U.S. at 108–09 (citing Robertson, 268 U.S. at 622–23).
301
Id. at 109, 109 n.10; see Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1987 n.248 (1991).
302
Omni, 484 U.S. at 109.
303
See Kelleher, supra note 293, at 1199; Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum
Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1203 n.384 (2006);
Solimine, supra note 298.
304
Omni, 484 U.S. at 109.
305
Id. (emphasis added).
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national personal jurisdiction over anchor claims.306 But many commentators
vehemently contest this notion, arguing that § 1367 confers only subject matter,
not personal, jurisdictional power.307 Moreover, even if it is the case that § 1367
today confers on the federal courts supplemental national personal jurisdiction,
supplemental national personal jurisdiction predates § 1367.308 Presumably,
then, in the years before § 1367’s enactment, supplemental national personal
jurisdiction existed—and possibly exists today as well—based upon federal
courts’ interstitial reading of statutes conferring national personal jurisdiction
over particular claims.309
Where does this leave us with respect to the broad notion of common lawbased supplemental national personal jurisdiction? One possibility is that only
narrow, interstitial common law rulemaking is possible. On this account,
supplemental national personal jurisdiction may represent the full extent of
possible common law forms of national personal jurisdiction.310
Another possibility is that broader federal court common law rulemaking
authority might be possible, but only consistent with the existing federal court

306
§ 1367(a) confers on the federal district courts, “in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, . . . supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012). One can take the position that, by extending power to
the constitutional limit, Congress granted supplemental national personal jurisdiction related closely enough to
anchor claims as to which Congress has conveyed explicit national personal jurisdiction. As noted above, while
the Court once expressed the view that personal jurisdiction originates in the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses,
in fact the Court elsewhere has recognized that it originates in international law principles that predate the
Constitution. See Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 796, 804
(N.D. Ohio 1998); supra note 35.
307
See supra note 166. The Federal Practice and Procedure treatise argues:

Neither the plain meaning of [Section 1367], which shows it to be a subject matter jurisdiction
provision, nor its legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended Section 1367
to include personal jurisdiction, and only a few opinions since Section 1367 was enacted have
found that it should be read “broadly” to include personal jurisdiction . . . . Thus, if pendent
personal jurisdiction exists, it must be properly understood to be a federal common law doctrine.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, at § 1069.7 (footnote omitted). But the fact that neither the plain language nor
the legislative history of § 1367 contemplates personal jurisdiction hardly seems conclusive. Time has proven
§ 1367 to have numerous unexpected and unintended consequences. See generally Thomas C. Arthur & Richard
D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963
(1991); Freer, supra note 169.
308
See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
309
See Berger, supra note 96, at 330; Simard, supra note 73, at 1650–52; James S. Cochran, Note,
Personal Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1475–79 (1986).
310
See Lilly, supra note 20, at 142 (“Although [federal court] opinions vary somewhat in their reasons for
rejecting a national contacts doctrine [in diversity cases], the most convincing rationale is the absence of an
express federal provision containing a federal standard of amenability.”).
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architecture that Congress and its delegates have put in place.311 This would
mean that common law authority to generate national personal jurisdiction could
only exist if the background of the federal judicial system was consistent with
that notion. For example, perhaps if Congress had indeed created a unitary,
national federal trial court but not specified the basis for its personal jurisdiction
authority, the court could conclude as a matter of common law that it enjoyed
national personal jurisdictional power. But of course, that is not the case:
Congress has long ensconced subnational districts, and indeed districts largely
confined to areas within states.312 Thus, the congressional design for the federal
judiciary is inconsistent with a common law form of national personal
jurisdiction. Putting matters slightly differently, even if there is some common
law power in the federal courts to come up with jurisdictional standards, the
measure of that common law313 cannot, given the backdrop of the current federal
judicial architecture, be—absent true interstitial common lawmaking—national
personal jurisdiction.314
CONCLUSION
This Article elucidates the viability of national personal jurisdiction. The
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires only minimum contacts with
the United States as a whole. That Clause also considers the fairness only of
requiring a defendant to litigate within the territory of the United States. That
said, Congress can, and should, introduce greater fairness protections
subconstitutionally.315
Congress has the power to introduce national personal jurisdiction to all
claims that fall within or could fall within federal court jurisdiction. In contrast,

311
See id. at 134 (“The general plan of [R]ule 4 is thus to adopt by reference the extraterritorial amenability
provisions of federal and state statutes.”); supra text accompanying note 306. But see von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 45, at 1123 n.6 (“Arguably, federal courts do not require enabling legislation to assume adjudicatory
jurisdiction under federal standards . . . .”).
312
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
313
See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (concluding that federal
common law was appropriate in the case at bar, but then turning to the question of what the content of that
federal common law should be).
314
See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text (noting that the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), is logical only in light of the congressional decision to establish
federal district courts in every state); cf. Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001)
(after finding that federal common law governed the res judicata effects of a federal diversity court judgment,
concluding—implicitly in light of the existing federal judicial architecture—that this was “a classic case for
adopting, as the federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in the State
in which the federal diversity court sits”).
315
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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the Fourteenth Amendment prevents state courts from exercising national
personal jurisdiction. Congress does have the power, however, if it chooses, to
expand federal court jurisdiction and thus allow more cases to fall under the
national personal jurisdiction umbrella. Finally, common law-based national
personal jurisdiction, if it is possible at all, is limited to interstitial lawmaking,
and perhaps also to lawmaking against a backdrop of existing statutory national
personal jurisdiction.

